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Corrective Justice as Making Amends
ERIK ENCARNACIONt
INTRODUCTION
Many tort theorists try to explain tort law in terms of
corrective justice.' Formulations vary, but traditional
accounts of corrective justice hold roughly that one person
who wrongfully injures another has a duty to repair the
injury or offset the losses resulting from that injury.2 Suppose
that Alice negligently breaks Bob's wrist. According to
f Ph.D. Candidate, University of Southern California, School of Philosophy; J.D.,
Columbia Law School. The author would like to thank Rima Basu, Sharon Lloyd,
Andrei Marmor, Caleb Perl, Scott Soames, Gabriel Uzquiano-Cruz, and Gary
Watson for their comments on earlier versions of what eventually became Parts I
through III of this article. Special thanks are owed to Steve Bero, Greg Keating,
Elizabeth Lee, and Aness Webster, each of whom gave invaluable and detailed
feedback on the whole article. Finally, very special thanks are owed to Scott
Hershovitz, whose detailed criticisms substantially improved this article--or so
the author hopes. This article was written with support from the University of
Southern California's Provost Fellowship.
1. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 13-24 (2001)
[hereinafter COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE]; JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND
WRONGS 361 (1992) [hereinafter COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS] ("A loss falls
within the ambit of corrective justice only if it is wrongful. . .. Corrective justice
responds to such losses by imposing on individuals a duty to repair them.");
ERNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 9-37 (2012) [hereinafter WEINRIB,
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE]; ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 56-83 (1995)
[hereinafter WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW]; Martin Stone, The Significance
of Doing and Suffering, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 131, 137-38 (Gerald
J. Postema ed., 2001) [hereinafter Stone, The Significance of Doing and
Suffering].
2. See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 1, at 15 ("[I]ndividuals
who are responsible for the wrongful losses of others have a duty to repair the
losses") (italics omitted); Martin Stone, On the Idea of Private Law, 9 CAN. J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 235, 253 (1996) [hereinafter Stone, On the Idea of Private Law]
(construing corrective justice in terms of one person's being "answerable for the
harmful effects of her actions on another"). Zipursky suggests the following
formulation: "One who causes a wrongful injury to another is obligated to
compensate the other for the injury caused." Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil
Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 700 (2003) [hereinafter
Zipursky, Civil Recourse].
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traditional corrective justice theory, Alice incurs an
obligation to compensate Bob for the losses associated with
repairing the wrist, and Bob immediately obtains a
correlative right to receive compensation from Alice.
Corrective justice theorists claim that some moral principle
of corrective justice explains why Alice and Bob stand in this
bilateral relation to each other, morally speaking, and
moreover, why tort law appears to embody or reflect this
relation.'
In recent years, John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C.
Zipursky, the leading proponents of civil recourse theory,
have objected forcefully to corrective justice theory. They
deny that corrective justice adequately accounts for
important features of tort law.' In particular, they claim that
corrective justice cannot explain (1) the diversity of remedies
beyond compensatory damages available in tort (such as
injunctive relief and punitive damages); (2) "substantive
standing" doctrines that prevent certain plaintiffs from
obtaining relief (even in cases where they have been
wrongfully injured by the defendants); and (3) the structural
fact that a legal duty to repair the victim's losses does not
arise at the moment a tort occurs (even though corrective
3. This raises questions about what it means to "explain" a "central" feature
of tort law. These questions are explored in COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE,
supra note 1, at 25-63 (distinguishing several kinds of explanatory theories and
arguing that economic accounts are not persuasive when understood as any of
these kinds) and Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 703-09 (discussing
various interpretations of the bipolarity argument and Zipursky's own version of
"pragmatic conceptualism"-a methodology for interpreting legal institutions).
4. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v.
Full Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 436 (2006) [hereinafter Goldberg,
Two Conceptions] (aiming to "complicate" the apparently tight link between
remedies in tort law and the aspiration to make plaintiffs "whole"); John C.P.
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEx. L. REV. 917, 953-54
(2010) [hereinafter Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs] (claiming the
explanatory superiority of their own wrongs-and-recourse model of tort law to
theories of corrective justice); Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 709-24.
5. John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 576
(2003) [hereinafter Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory] (criticizing
corrective justice for, among other things, rendering "the well-established
institution of punitive damages problematic"); Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra
note 2, at 709-10.
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justice seemingly predicts that such a correlative duty would
arise simultaneously with the right to reparations).6
Collectively, these claims purportedly show that corrective
justice cannot explain or justify important features of tort
law.
This paper outlines a new conception of corrective justice
capable of responding to these attacks.' To see what
motivates the conception, we will begin with some
background. Part I explains the three main objections to
traditional corrective justice theories advanced by civil
recourse theorists. Part II sets out a recent attempt by Scott
Hershovitz to revise corrective justice theory in response to
these objections.9 Unfortunately, Hershovitz's theory-the
"getting-even" conception of corrective justice-faces a new
set of difficulties, which are discussed in Part III. As we will
see, the main difficulty is that Hershovitz's theory blurs the
6. See, e.g., Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 709-24; John C.P.
Goldberg, Wrongs Without Recourse: A Comment on Jason Solomon's Judging
Plaintiffs, 61 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 9, 13 (2008) [hereinafter Goldberg, Wrongs
Without Recourse], http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/content/articles/2008/11/
Goldberg-61-Vand-L-Rey-En-Banc-9.pdf.
7. This would also be somewhat ironic because corrective justice theory's
crowning achievements include undermining influential economic explanations
of tort law. For the relevant economic explanations, see generally GUIDO
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). The arguments against these approaches
appear in numerous places. See, e.g., COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note
1, at 13-24; Stone, The Significance of Doing and Suffering, supra note 1, at 142-
52; Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485, 503-10
(1989) [hereinafter Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law].
8. See Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63
STAN. L. REV. 67, 69 (2010) [hereinafter Hershovitz, Harry Potter] ("[T]o generate
an adequate corrective justice account of tort, we must revise our understanding
of what corrective justice is."). Another way defenders of corrective justice might
respond is by disputing the purported importance of the recalcitrant data that
civil recourse theorists rely on to motivate their attacks. A detailed version of this
reply can be found in WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 97 ("Punitive
damages are inconsistent with corrective justice for reasons both of structure and
of content."); John Gardner, Torts and Other Wrongs, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 43,
53-54 (2011) [hereinafter Gardner, Torts and Other Wrongs] (emphasizing that
the only form of relief awarded "as of right" in tort law is compensatory damages).
9. Scott Hershovitz, Corrective Justice for Civil Recourse Theorists, 39 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 107, 126 (2011) [hereinafter Hershovitz, Corrective Justice].
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line between retributive and corrective justice and hence
distorts rather than illuminates tort law.
The point of presenting and criticizing Hershovitz's views
is not simply to expose the shortcomings of a particular
theory. Scrutinizing the limitations of Hershovitz's approach
will help us avoid pitfalls en route to an alternative. Part IV
sketches a new account, which will be called the "making
amends" theory of corrective justice. Roughly put, the
principle of corrective justice that will be defended holds that
individuals who are responsible for the wrongs that happen
to others have a duty to make amends to them unless the
victims of those wrongs do not want them to. Tort law, in turn,
should be understood as a public institution that aims to
facilitate the amends-making process by mitigating certain
recurring problems that occur in the informal amends-
making process, while protecting the morally important
interests of victims in controlling aspects of that process.
Reparative relief should be understood, moreover, as the
default mode of making amends.
There is a lot to unpack in these claims. To preview,
notice two differences between the new approach to
corrective justice and traditional, repair-based conceptions:
first, rather than a duty of repair, the principle contains a
duty to make amends. Because the manner in which one
makes amends is more flexible than how one repairs wrongful
losses, this allows us to respond more readily to objection (1)
that corrective justice cannot account for the variety of
remedies available in tort. As we will see, making amends
may require reparations, but need not. Making amends may
require more or less depending on the circumstances. The
second salient difference is the inclusion of an "unless"
clause. Most statements of the principles of corrective justice
overlook the fact that there are limits on the duties of
wrongdoers to respond to their victims. One overlooked limit
is that sometimes victims do not want to interact with the
wrongdoer and do not want them to try to make amends.
Understanding this limit, as well as problems that routinely
crop up in informal amends-making processes, will be
important in answering the structural objections proffered by
civil recourse theorists (mentioned above at (2) and (3)). The
story is complicated but, again, we will see that the reason
that tort law's basic normative structure differs from that of
454 [Vol. 62
MAKING AMENDS
corrective justice is that tort law aims to overcome practical
obstacles to the amends-making process while also serving to
protect the victims' morally important interests in
controlling aspects of that process. Explaining all of this in
greater depth will be the task of Part IV.
After sketching out the making-amends conception of
corrective justice and how it can be used to explain tort law,
the making-amends conception will be tested against various
objections in Part V. As we will see, the new account stands
up to a range of objections including the civil recourse
critique. We will conclude by observing that instrumentalist
appeals to corrective justice can help explain and justify why
that legal structure is the way it is and does not need to carve
tort law at the joints in all ways.
I. THE CIVIL RECOURSE CRITIQUE OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
Corrective justice theorists try to explain tort law's key
features in terms of moral principles of corrective justice.
There is no canonical statement of these principles. For our
purposes we will treat Jules Coleman's statement as
representative: "individuals who are responsible for the
wrongful losses of others have a duty to repair the losses."0 To
be sure, not all corrective justice theorists endorse this
formulation. And it raises several worries, some of which are
peculiar to his view." But for the purposes of fixing Goldberg
and Zipursky's target, the principle will do just fine, since the
civil recourse critique applies to a wide array of formulations
including Coleman's.
With the target in place, let us turn to the tripartite
critique of traditional corrective justice theory posed by the
civil recourse theorists. Let us call the objections: the
remedies objection, the "substantive standing" objection, and
10. COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 1, at 15.
11. For example, how do we square the principle with strict liability doctrines?
Those doctrines seemingly allow liability without wrongdoing. But see, e.g.,
Gregory C. Keating, Property Rights and Tortious Wrongs in Vincent v. Lake Erie,
5 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 3-4 (2005) (discussing views holding that the
relevant wrong in strict liability cases is the failure to make voluntary
reparations).
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the no-legal-duty objection. Understanding them will be
crucial for understanding what follows.
A. The Remedies Objection
The first objection claims that corrective justice theories
cannot explain why courts regularly award non-
compensatory relief.2 The objection runs as follows.
According to corrective justice theory, defendants have a duty
to repair wrongful losses. But duties to repair are
compensatory in nature: satisfying one's duty of repair
involves identifying the costs wrongfully incurred by the
victim as a result of the wrongdoing and trying to offset those
losses or undo the wrong to the extent possible." For
example, if one is responsible for breaking another's wrist,
the responsible party should at least pay for the losses
associated with repairing the wrist, including paying for
related medical costs. And it is a well-known commonplace
that tort law does, in fact, award compensatory damages to
plaintiffs in precisely this way. One Aristotelian metaphor
often used to capture this commonplace is that damages
awards in tort aim to make victims "whole."14
The alleged problem, however, is that many remedies
besides compensatory relief are available in tort suits."
12. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 710.
13. See Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, supra note 5, at 573-74.
14. E.g., Che v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.3d 31, 43 (1st Cir. 2003) ("We
have recognized that reinstatement is an important remedy because it 'most
efficiently' advances the goals of Title VII by making plaintiffs whole while also
deterring future discriminatory conduct by employers."); De Lude v. Rimek, 115
N.E.2d 561, 564-65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1953) ("The controlling principle is that where
compensation is the objective of the law, recovery is limited to the damages
sustained, and any payments made by MacNevin to the end of making plaintiffs
whole must be deducted from the recovery in this action."); Senn v. Manchester
Bank of St. Louis, 583 S.W.2d 119, 135 (Mo. 1979) (claiming that there was
authority for having "substituted money for the land itself as a means of making
plaintiffs whole").
15. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 710 ("The problem is that courts
do many things in tort law once they have decided that the defendant committed
a tort upon the plaintiff; the imposition of liability for the wrongful injury created
by the defendant is simply one of many remedies granted-a particular form of
compensatory damages.").
456 [Vol. 62
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Punitive damages, nominal damages, and injunctions are
regularly awarded.16 And often we cannot fairly construe
these forms of relief in terms of reparations. Punitive
damages seemingly aim to punish, not repair. 7 Nominal
damages have nothing to do with reparative relief.'" And
because many forms of injunctive relief aim primarily to
prevent or force future conduct, injunctive relief is hard to
square with compensatory damages concerned with past
wrongdoings.19
The fact that tort law regularly awards these forms of
relief seems aberrational when viewed through the lens of
traditional corrective justice theory. But they are not
aberrational, according to Goldberg and Zipursky.2 0 They are
central features of tort practice, and any explanatory theory
of tort law (like corrective justice) that fails to account for
them, or that treats them as ancillary or extraordinary,
counts as a major shortcoming in that theory.2 '
The remedies objection points toward a deeper worry.
The existence of diverse remedies highlights a fact that
corrective justice theories have difficulty grappling with: tort
law separates the question of whether a plaintiff has a right
to action from the question of the appropriate nature of the
remedy that should apply.2 2 This is why a diversity of
remedies is available in tort.23 But corrective justice illicitly
unites wrongdoing with a particular type of relief
(compensatory remedies) because corrective justice implies
16. Id. at 711.
17. See id. at 750 (claiming that punitive damages "are actually seeking to
vindicate their rights by inflicting a sanction on the defendant") (emphasis
added).
18. Id. at 711 ("By definition, these types of damages [such as punitive and
nominal damages] do not concern responsibility for the loss created.").
19. See id. at 711 ("Corrective justice theory is similarly unable to explain why
a variety of injunctive remedies are available.").
20. See id. at 711-13.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 711-12.
23. Id. ("The diversity of remedies indicates that the issue of whether there is
a right of action in tort is distinct from the issue of what the remedy should be.").
2014] 457
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that a finding of wrongdoing immediately triggers a duty to
repair.2 4 The law, however, contains no "direct link between
the notion of a right of action and the imposition of liability"
in compensatory form.2 5 A finding of a legal wrongdoing does
not automatically trigger a particular form of remedy. We
will see this point again from a different angle when we
address the no-legal-duty objection.
B. The "Substantive Standing" Objection
The second objection claims that corrective justice
allegedly fails to account for so-called "substantive standing"
requirements, which appear in most, if not all, causes of
action recognized in tort law.2 6 According to these
requirements, not only must a plaintiff show that she has
suffered injuries resulting from the defendant's tortious
conduct, a plaintiff must also stand in the right kind of
status, as a victim, in relation to the defendant's wrongdoing
in order to properly state a tort claim.27 In other words, "[a]
plaintiff may recover against a defendant for a tort only if the
defendant's conduct was tortious relative to the plaintiff."2 8
The point is subtle. Perhaps the best way to flesh it out
is through examples. Zipursky provides several of them in his
seminal article, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of
Torts.2 9 He points out that, in raising a defamation claim, a
plaintiff cannot win unless she can show that "she herself
24. Id. at 712. Zipursky states:
[I]t is possible for the plaintiff to have a right of action in tort without
reaching the question of whether [the] defendant has a duty of repair.
So, although the commission of a tort by the defendant gives rise to a
right to some sort of remedy in the plaintiff, the existence of this right to
a remedy cannot be dependent upon the plaintiff being the owner of a
loss and therefore the beneficiary of the defendant's duty of repair.
Id.
25. Id. at 713.
26. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts,
51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) [hereinafter Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs].
27. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 714.
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, supra note 26, at 17-19.
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was defamed." 0 This requirement is reflected in the so-called
"of and concerning" element of the defamation tort, which
holds that defamation plaintiffs must show that the allegedly
defamatory statements are "of and concerning" the
plaintiffs." This is so even if the plaintiff can show that the
defendant made a defamatory statement that injured her
foreseeably.32 Likewise, plaintiffs alleging fraud must allege
more than an injury flowing from the defendant's intentional
deception; they must further allege that they themselves
relied on the deception." To illustrate the point in the law of
negligence, Zipursky cites Cardozo's famous opinion in
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad.3 4 In Palsgraf, Palsgraf's
injury was caused by the wrongful conduct of the railroad's
employee, yet the court concluded that the railroad owed no
duty to her in particular, and as a result, she could not
recover from the railroad." Showing that an injury flowed
from wrongful conduct of others is not sufficient to justify
recovery. All of these cases illustrate, according to Zipursky,
that "tort law declines to impose liability on defendants in
favor of the bearers of . . . wrongful losses" without
establishing that the plaintiff bears the right relation as a
victim of the defendant's tortious conduct.3 6 This is the
hallmark of tort law's substantive standing requirements.
To see how these observations are supposed to
undermine traditional corrective justice theories, Zipursky
claims that any attempt to explain these ubiquitous
"substantive standing requirements" in terms of corrective
30. Id. at 17.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 18-19.
34. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 715 (citing Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928)).
35. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99. Cardozo declined to see the issue (of whether Mrs.
Palsgraf could recover) in terms of causation-proximate or otherwise. Id. at 101
("The law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to the case before us.
The question of liability is always anterior to the question of the measure of the
consequences that go with liability.").
36. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 714.
4592014]
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justice faces a dilemma." To the extent that corrective justice
theorists try to explain tort law in terms of genuine principles
of corrective justice that contain plausible conceptions of
moral responsibility, Zipursky claims that those conceptions
of moral responsibility would impose liability in many cases
in which tort law would not, given the restrictions imposed
by substantive standing requirements." This is the first
horn. As for the second horn, Zipursky claims that, to the
extent that some proposed principles of corrective justice
could explain substantive standing requirements, they no
longer reflect or contain independently plausible conceptions
of moral responsibility.3 9
To see this dilemma at work, consider Jules Coleman's
proposed principle: "individuals who are responsible for the
wrongful losses of others have a duty to repair the losses."40
On one interpretation, Zipursky would be prepared to
acknowledge that this is a plausible moral principle. This
"plausible" interpretation depends on a particular way of
understanding what it means for X to be responsible for Y's
wrongful losses. If this means that X is responsible for Y's
losses only if those losses are the reasonably foreseeable
results of X's conduct, then Zipursky is indeed willing to
37. See id. at 716-18 (criticizing the work of Stephen Perry (which states, in
Zipursky's view, a plausible conception of moral responsibility for outcomes but
one that does not fit actual legal practice) and Jules Coleman (which, Zipursky
seemingly claims, might make for a better fit with actual legal practice but which
no longer accords with any plausible view of moral responsibility)).
38. See id. at 717. Zipursky states:
Remarkably, the doctrines that fall under the rubric of substantive
standing do not impose a duty of repair upon defendants even for
reasonably foreseeable injuries caused by wrongful conduct. Thus,
parents who are traumatized when a surgeon's negligence on the
operating table disfigures their child will not be able to recover from the
surgeon for this trauma-even though our tort law now views emotional
trauma as sufficiently real to be compensable, even though it regards the
surgeon's negligence as a legal wrong, and even though the emotional
impact on parents of having their child disfigured is surely foreseeable.
Id.
39. See id. at 718 ("If 'fault' is a placeholder for a nexus-requirement that
already happens to exist in tort law, then it is an illusion that responsibility has
been accounted for in terms of fault.").
40. COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 1, at 15.
460 [Vol. 62
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concede that Coleman's principle counts as a plausible
formulation of a genuine moral principle.4 1 The principle is
plausible because, according to Zipursky, we simply are
morally responsible for the foreseeable results of our
conduct.4 2 Corrective Justice, on this interpretation, refers to
a true principle of moral responsibility.
But this moral plausibility comes at a price, since the
principle can no longer account for substantive standing
requirements in tort law. To see why, Zipursky points out
that substantive standing requirements often deny recovery
even in cases where a plaintiffs injury is a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of tortious conduct. 43 This is why,
according to Zipursky, "parents who are traumatized when a
surgeon's negligence on the operating table disfigures their
child will not be able to recover from the surgeon for this
trauma"-even though the suffering of parents in such
circumstances is reasonably foreseeable." This is also why
plaintiffs alleging defamation must show not only that they
were injured as a foreseeable result of the defendant's
defamatory statement; they must also show that the
statement was "of and concerning" them.45  The first
interpretation of Coleman's principle,46  even though it
renders the principle plausible as a genuine moral principle,
would imply that we ought to impose liability in many cases
41. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 717 (acknowledging that "[t]he
constraint of foreseeability in our non-legal practices of blame ascription reflects
something deep in our notion of responsibility").
42. Id. Actually, Zipursky associates this interpretation with the work of
Stephen Perry on outcome responsibility, not Jules Coleman's principle. See id.
at 716-17 (citing Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA
L. REV. 449, 503-12 (1992)). But the same dilemma is supposed to arise for any
plausible principle of corrective justice: either it is a true moral principle (and it
is both over- and under-inclusive of the scope of actually recognized torts like
defamation), or it is not over- and under-inclusive, in which case it no longer
seems plausible as a true moral principle. So the present conflation of Perry's and
Coleman's different views on corrective justice does not matter for purposes of the
critique.
43. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 717.
44. Id.
45. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, supra note 26, at 17.
46. See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 1, at 15.
2014] 461
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where tort law does not. In short, substantive standing
requirements sometimes prevent plaintiffs from recovering
from defendants even though those defendants are morally
responsible for the plaintiffs' wrongful losses. The first
interpretation falls on the first horn of the dilemma-that is,
true moral principles of corrective justice exceed the reach of
actually recognized torts.
There is another interpretation of Coleman's principle
arguably capable of explaining why tort law contains
substantive standing requirements. On this interpretation,
advanced by Coleman himself, we should understand X's
being responsible for Y's losses as implying X is at fault for
Y's losses, in the sense of being "within the scope of the risks
that make the aspect of [X's] conduct at fault."47 How are we
to understand fault here? The full answer is complicated, but
at a minimum, the notion of fault somehow automatically
incorporates "the kind of nexus between conduct and injury
that tort law actually reflects."4 8
In response to this proposal, Zipursky admits that
construing the relation of being responsible for an outcome as
Coleman suggests might account for all the relevant
substantive standing elements.49 But Zipursky thinks that
this answer also comes at a price. 0 Coleman's answer can
explain substantive standing requirements but no longer
seems plausible as a genuine moral principle. The concept of
fault that Coleman invokes simply does not track ordinary
moral notions of fault. Tort law sometimes refuses to find
defendants liable-again, due to substantive standing
requirements-even though the injuries did arguably fall
within the "nexus" linking the conduct and injury, cases in
which the defendant plainly appears "at fault." But if
Coleman's concept of fault does not track our ordinary moral
concept of fault, this means that Coleman's version operates
as an empty "placeholder" for the standing requirements
47. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 1, at 346.
48. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 717.
49. See id. at 718.
50. Id.
462 [Vol. 62
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already found in tort law." And the same argument applies
to any proposed specification of the being-responsible-for
relation, whether couched in terms of fault or not. To the
extent the being-responsible-for relation already presupposes
or incorporates substantive standing doctrines found in tort
law, the relation seems far less plausible as a genuinely
moral one as opposed to being an empty vessel standing in
for legally recognized standing requirements.5 2
To summarize: corrective justice theories aim to explain
tort law in terms of genuine moral principles. But moral
principles of corrective justice cannot explain substantive
standing requirements because the principles imply more
liability than those requirements allow, to the extent those
principles are plausible as genuine moral principles."
Adjusting these theories in order to accommodate
substantive standing requirements simply renders those
principles implausible as genuine moral principles of
corrective justice. Theorists of corrective justice are thus
gored on the horns of a dilemma.
C. The No-Legal-Duty Objection
This brings us to the final objection to corrective justice,
which focuses on the timing of the duty to repair.5 4
Traditional, Aristotelian versions of corrective justice hold
that a victim's right to compensation arises immediately
when one person wrongs another, and that the wrongdoer
51. Id.
52. Zipursky also claims that, even if we were to accept this understanding of
responsibility as it appears in the principle of corrective justice, the law still
imposes tort liability in cases where the principle of corrective justice would not.
He claims, for example, some people can recover for "consequential damages" not
part of the "predicate injury" itself. See id. at 718. This response appears to
underscore the diversity-of-remedies issue and therefore does not include it in the
discussion above. That is, if corrective justice theorists expanded their conception
of the duty of repair to include more than simply reparations, this response does
not seem to have much bite.
53. The law also imposes liability where morality arguably would not, such as
cases of harmless, accidental trespassing. Id. at 726-27 (mentioning trespass as a
case where tort liability would attach but moral blameworthiness would not).
54. See id. at 718-21.
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immediately incurs a correlative duty to compensate the
victim." Coleman's principle is representative of the
Aristotelian tradition: "individuals who are responsible for
the wrongful losses of others have a duty to repair the losses."5 6
One would naturally expect tort law to reflect this structure
if tort law were explicable in terms of principles like
Coleman's. That is, if tort law's basic structure were a legal
correlate to the moral principle of corrective justice, a
tortfeasor would have an affirmative legal duty to repair that
would arise the moment she commits a tort against a victim.
But tort law does not work this way. Goldberg articulates
the point succinctly:
Notice, however, that the conversion of the moral duty of repair into
a legal duty does not happen through the tort system unless and
until the victim decides to press a claim against the defendant. In
other words, if the defendant is going to be made to heed his duty
of repair, it will only be by virtue of the law's having empowered
the victim to demand of the defendant that he make amends for the
wrong done. . . . Corrective justice theory thus fails to capture
accurately the terms on which tort links a victim to a person who
has victimized her.5 7
In other words: if X breaches his duty of care towards Y
and wrongfully causes Y's injuries as a result, nothing in tort
law imposes on X a duty to repair Y's injuries at the very
moment the injury occurs. At most, X is liable to Y, but this
does not yet mean X incurs a legal obligation to compensate
Y. Civil recourse theorists thus maintain a sharp distinction
between a legal liability and an affirmative obligation to
pay." Corrective justice implies the latter; tort law holds that
only the former occurs when someone wrongfully injures
another. The duty of repair, in short, is not automatic in the
way that the principle of corrective justice suggests.
55. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2
LAw & PHIL. 37, 38 (1983).
56. Id.
57. Goldberg, Wrongs Without Recourse, supra note 6, at 13 (emphasis added).
58. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 720-21.
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To bolster this claim, Zipursky compares contractual
liability with that of liability in tort law. 9 Courts award
prejudgment interest to plaintiffs that win breach-of-contract
claims on the theory that defendants are obligated to pay
plaintiffs at the time specified by the original contract.6 0
Prejudgment interest is justified on the grounds that the
defendant's subsequent delay of payment, due to litigation,
further deprived the plaintiff of the time-value of the money
the defendant was obligated to pay at the moment the
contract was breached. In cases arising from breaches of
contract, liable parties are deemed liable as of the moment of
breach, and hence, the breaching party is also responsible for
the victim's lost interest.6' But prejudgment interest is not
normally awarded in torts cases. 62 Why?
According to civil recourse theorists, a defendant in a
torts case, unlike a defendant in a breach-of-contract case, is
not legally obligated to compensate the plaintiff at the
moment that the defendant injures the plaintiff.63 The duty
to pay arises, if at all, only after a finding of liability.64 But
corrective justice seemingly predicts the opposite result. Not
only are defendants liable at the moment they wrongfully
cause the plaintiffs' injuries, but, according to corrective
justice, they should be liable for reparative relief, most likely
in the form of compensatory damages. So we should expect
that prejudgment interest would begin to accrue the moment
the wrongdoing causes the plaintiffs injury. Since civil
recourse theorists claim tort law does not work this way,
corrective justice apparently fails to account for a major
feature of tort law's basic normative structure.
59. See id. at 719.
60. Id. (explaining that "one who fails to pay under a contract will incur
prejudgment interest because payment is owed at the time the contract specifies
for performance, not at the time a court reaches a judgment").
61. See Hershovitz, Corrective Justice, supra note 9, at 109.
62. Id.; Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 719-20.
63. See Hershovitz, Corrective Justice, supra note 9, at 109.
64. See id.
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II. THE GETTING-EVEN CONCEPTION
A. The Approach Outlined
In response to the civil recourse objections, Scott
Hershovitz presents an alternative that he calls the "getting-
even" conception.65 According to this view, corrective justice
occurs when a victim of a wrongdoing in some sense "gets
even" with the wrongdoer.6 6 In turn, tort law aims "to give
people who have been wronged an opportunity to get even."67
Because the concept of getting even is central to
Hershovitz's explanation of corrective justice and tort law, it
is worth considering in detail. The phrase "getting even"
implies revenge. 68 But Hershovitz construes the idea of
evenness more broadly. He asks us to consider the subtle
practices in which one person settles an existing obligation
with another.6 9 To take one example, consider Tom and
Jerry.7 0 Suppose that they are friends, and that Jerry loans
Tom some money.7' Now suppose that, sometime later and
before Tom can pay Jerry back, Tom performs some good
deed for Jerry.7 2 According to Hershovitz, Jerry has the
ability to declare Tom "even" or "square" and to do so in a way
65. Id. at 118. Hershovitz has an independent objection to traditional
corrective justice. See id. at 110-17 (arguing that corrective justice purports to
accomplish the impossible, namely, undoing wrongful acts or otherwise making
victims whole). Suffice it to say that Hershovitz thinks that his own approach
avoids this worry. Although it is not obvious that Hershovitz succeeds, this paper
focuses on the civil recourse objections to keep things simple.
66. Id. at 127.
67. Id.
68. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 454 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "to get even (with)"
as "to take one's revenge (on), to retaliate (against)").
69. Hershovitz, Corrective Justice, supra note 9, at 121 ("Our judgments about
what it takes to get people even are nuanced.").
70. Id. at 118-19 (describing the Tom-and-Jerry case).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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that genuinely settles Tom's pre-existing debt." Jerry may,
in short, declare Tom and Jerry even with one another.7 4
Hershovitz uses Tom and Jerry to illustrate some of the
ingredients typically needed to render parties even with each
other. The first thing to notice is that, in order for Tom and
Jerry to be even, Jerry must perform some act. In this case,
the performance comes in the form of a speech act, in which
Jerry declares something like "we're even" or "we're
square." We might call this kind of speech act a declaration
of evenness. Hershovitz asserts that getting even is
performative, and hence that getting even will require such a
speech act.7
Like any speech act, whether a declaration of evenness
succeeds in rendering Tom and Jerry even with each other
depends on felicity conditions-background conditions that
must be satisfied in order for the performative to succeed.
Whether a speech act like a pronouncement of marriage
succeeds depends not only on whether an officiant utters the
sentence "I now pronounce you husband and wife," but also
on other facts like whether the officiant has authority to
officiate marriages.7 9
Likewise, whether Jerry's declaration of evenness
succeeds-in order for Jerry and Tom to in fact be even with
each other-many background conditions must be satisfied.
These conditions include, but are not limited to, the
following:
* An Obligation. Some obligation must already run from
one party to a second party. In the case of Tom and Jerry the
obligation is a pre-existing debt for a well-defined amount of
73. See id. at 119.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 128.
77. Id. at 119. For more on speech acts, see generally J.L. AuSTIN, How To Do
THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbish eds., 2d ed. 1975).
78. Hershovitz, Corrective Justice, supra note 9, at 119.
79. Id.
2014] 467
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
money (we suppose). 0 But if Jerry and Tom did not owe each
other anything, it would not make sense to say that Jerry had
the ability to declare Tom even with him.
* A Proportional and Appropriate Act. Another condition
is that Tom must have done something for Jerry that is
somehow roughly proportional to the debt he owed.8 ' If Tom's
favor to Jerry were extremely small as compared to the
amount owed, then it would not make sense for Jerry to call
Tom even.8 2 One might think that the better characterization
of Jerry's waiver of the debt would be as a gift to Tom-
though Hershovitz himself does not say this explicitly.83 But
this does not mean that the value of the favor must equal that
of the debt.8 4 The act must also be appropriate, insofar as it's
reasonable to assume that "there are moral limits on what
sorts of things people can properly regard as proportional."
An act that involves intentionally making Jerry worse off
would obviously not do.
* Acceptance. Hershovitz notes that, ideally, Tom and
Jerry "are not even until they jointly decide to regard one
another as even."6 Tom and Jerry ideally must be persuaded
that they are in fact even with each other.
Hershovitz uses these insights to revise our
understanding of corrective justice, and in turn, tort law. In
the context of corrective justice, rather than a creditor
declaring his debtor even, it is the victim of wrongdoing who
obtains a power to declare the wrongdoer even once the
victim has been wronged. Once we recognize that a victim of
80. Id. at 118.
81. Id. at 120 ("[P]rior to the declaration Tom must have done something which
could plausibly count as grounds for [being declared even].").
82. Id. ("Tom's action must be proportional to the debt. As I said before, if Tom's
debt was significant and his assistance slight, Tom would likely resist Jerry's
declaration, but even if he acquiesced, Tom and Jerry would not be even.").
83. Id.
84. Id. at 118 (denying that Jerry's declaration of evenness means "that he has
judged that Tom's services are worth approximately the debt owed").
85. Id. at 120 ("In addition to ruling out cases where Tom has done nothing,
we can rule out cases in which the act in question harmed Jerry.").
86. Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
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wrongdoing has this power, a new picture of corrective justice
emerges. According to Hershovitz, corrective justice occurs
when the victim and wrongdoer are validly declared even
with each other.87 And, as we have seen, whether this
declaration is valid depends on numerous background
conditions. Thus, we can understand part of the process of
corrective justice as making sure that these various
background conditions occur.
To illustrate, suppose that rather than a pre-existing
debt to Jerry, Tom wrongfully injured Jerry's leg." Again,
many factors determine whether Jerry's declaration of
evenness succeeds. There must be a declaration of the kind,
"we're even," Tom must actually do something for Jerry, and
Jerry ordinarily must accept the act as adequate. Whether
Tom's act is adequate will in turn depend on a number of
other factors. Suppose Jerry and Tom are friends and the
injury was accidental.8 9 Perhaps a sincere apology might
suffice to support a declaration of evenness. 90 Suppose they
are not friends but that Tom apologizes and offers
compensation. 91 Maybe this will suffice. But now suppose
that Tom intentionally and maliciously injured Jerry.9 2 A
mere apology and offer of compensation might not be enough
to support Jerry's declaration of evenness. 93 In any event,
corrective justice is fundamentally about securing a
declaration of evenness between wrongdoer and victim. And
to do so the wrongdoer incurs an obligation to do something
for the victim in the aftermath of the wrongdoing, even
87. See id. at 118-20.
88. See id. at 121.
89. See id. ("It is hard to say without knowing something about Tom and
Jerry's relationship, and also just what Tom did. If Tom and Jerry are friends,
and Tom was merely negligent in breaking Jerry's leg, it is easy to imagine that
a sincere apology will suffice.").
90. According to Hershovitz, corrective justice potentially requires apologies.
See id. But others disagree. Id. at 112 ("Many philosophers would parse this
differently. They would say that returning the ball is a matter of corrective
justice, but apologizing is not, even though it may be morally obligatory.").
91. See id. at 121.
92. See id.
93. See id.
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though the precise remedy is not specified. This is the
getting-even conception in a nutshell.
Notice how Hershovitz's analysis contrasts with the
Aristotelian's conception. An Aristotelian interpretation of
Tom and Jerry's situation is straightforward: Tom would
have to do what he can to help repair Jerry's leg, which
typically means compensating Jerry to offset financial losses
resulting from his injury. Nothing more, nothing less.
Anything else that we could ask Tom to do for Jerry would
not be in the domain of corrective justice. In addition to
exposing traditional theories of corrective justice to the
remedies objection, Hershovitz claims that requiring
reparations is a problematic feature of traditional accounts,
since efforts to fully undo the injuries that flow from
wrongdoing are bound to fail; after all, at a minimum, we
cannot undo the time lost and energy expended in trying to
fix things.9 4
B. Getting Even Through Tort Law
As we have seen, Hershovitz thinks that corrective
justice is about a victim's getting even with a wrongdoer, and
in turn, that parties are "even" with each other only if there
has been a valid declaration of evenness declaring them even
with each other. A declaration of evenness, moreover, is valid
only when certain prerequisites have been satisfied. There
must be, for example, a proportional and appropriate act by
the wrongdoer that supports the declaration. And ideally,
though not necessarily, both parties must accept the
declaration of evenness.
We still seem a long way from providing an account that
helps illuminate tort law. After all, getting even seemingly
depends on innumerable facts besides obtaining an
adequately supported, joint declaration of evenness; tort law,
by contrast, purports to dole out corrective justice while
taking into account a much more limited set of variables.
94. See id. at 117 ("We cannot undo what we have done. No matter how hard
we wish that we could turn back time when a trigger is pulled or a driver hits a
child, we cannot."); see also Scott Hershovitz, What Does Tort Law Do? What Can
it Do?, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 99, 110 (2012) [hereinafter Hershovitz, What Does Tort
Law Do?] ("We can't 'reverse the wrongful transaction' for someone who has been
raped, or slandered, or falsely imprisoned.").
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What's more, people file lawsuits when they cannot secure
joint settlements outside of the court system.
But these are the right kinds of observations to make to
understand the relationship between the getting-even
account and tort law. The felicity conditions that must be
satisfied for parties to get even with each other are, according
to Hershovitz, complex and "nuanced."95 And one person
seeking a declaration of evenness may not get it from the
other person. Nor is it surprising that parties often disagree
sharply about what conditions must be satisfied for them to
be even. And even if they agree about those conditions, they
still might disagree about whether those conditions have
been satisfied. Tom might think an apology suffices; Jerry
might think the apology insincere or want something more.
And all of these problems presuppose that both parties are
willing to sit down and negotiate. What if Tom declines to
negotiate?
Absent a successful negotiation, and in certain societies
that do not have elaborate legal systems, Hershovitz notes
that one unilateral option for getting even is for the injured
party to seek revenge.96 Here Hershovitz embraces the
ordinary implication of the phrase "getting even" by pointing
to old Nordic methods of dispute resolution as historical
precedent.9 7 He details a case in which Norwegian merchants
chop off an Icelandic man's hand.9 8 The merchants are
confronted by other Icelanders and asked to pay a large
amount of money. 99 When the Norwegians decline, the
Icelanders respond by threatening to chop the hand off one of
the other Norwegians.'00 The Norwegians back down,
agreeing to pay the requested price. 101
95. Hershovitz, Corrective Justice, supra note 9, at 121.
96. See id. at 123.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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This brutal practice-indeed, any practice of seeking or
threatening revenge-seems destined to generate cycles of
violence.'02 To prevent violence from spiraling out of control,
Nordic peoples selected an oddman-an impartial arbiter
who tried to persuade disputing parties to agree to a
resolution that both parties could regard as fair.o3 Hershovitz
describes selecting an oddman as a way of "outsourcing the
performative necessary to get the parties even, and their
work was subject to a familiar felicity condition"-i.e., getting
parties to agree that they were even.'0
And here is where the point becomes important for
purposes of modern tort practice. The law steps in as the
modern analogue to oddmen, adjudicating disputes only
when the parties cannot themselves iron out how to get even
with each other on their own:
We prohibit private violence as a response to wrongdoing, but we
maintain the institution of the oddman, in the form of judges and
juries. When parties cannot negotiate their way their way back to
even, we offer a judicial failsafe--compulsory process, followed by
garnishment and attachment. A wrongdoer who will not bargain
can be haled into court and forced to submit to a jury's judgment as
to what will render him even with his victim. Though courts are
fond of saying that the plaintiff should be made whole, that is not
in fact what juries are asked to do. They are typically instructed to
award "fair and reasonable" compensation for a plaintiffs injury,
and in the cases where the wrongdoing is willful and wanton, they
may go beyond, and award punitive damages too. 0 5
So how do our courts achieve corrective justice? The same
way that oddmen achieved corrective justice, by persuading
us (including, ideally, the parties to the dispute) that the
parties are even: "Whether courts succeed in doing justice
depends on whether people regard the remedies awarded as
sufficient to render prevailing plaintiffs even." 0 6 In some
cases, compensatory damages will suffice, in others punitive
102. See, e.g., id. at 124.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 125.
106. Id.
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damages are enough, and still others, injunctive relief will be
necessary. 07
In sum, Hershovitz thinks getting even does a better job
of representing what tort actually involves than ideas
traditionally associated with corrective justice, such as
repairing injuries or making plaintiffs whole.'"0 As we will see
below, Hershovitz thinks that the getting-even conception
resists the civil recourse broadside. 09 Moreover, Hershovitz
claims that the getting-even picture marks an improvement
on the Aristotelian picture." 0 After all, corrective justice
aspires to do what it simply cannot do-i.e., putting victims
back to where they were prior to being injured by repairing
or annulling losses."' But corrective justice is not primarily
about repairing or annulling losses-it is about private
parties getting even with each other, and failing that,
"[giving] people who have been wronged an opportunity to get
even" by invoking a nonviolent system able to impose
evenness on them."2 One unilateral way someone can get
even for wrongdoing is by taking revenge;' "another
unilateral option is by filing a lawsuit. The success of the tort
system depends on its being seen as imposing reasonable
terms of evenness among disputants, including by imposing
remedies that might require more than simply affording
compensatory damages.'14
107. Id. at 127.
108. Id. at 126.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 127.
113. Hershovitz, What Does Tort Law Do?, supra note 94, at 116-17 (claiming
that "[t]he virtue in revenge was that it provided victims a way to get even with
wrongdoers unilaterally" and that "tort suit plays a similar role to revenge").
114. See Hershovitz, Corrective Justice, supra note 9, at 125 ("Whether courts
succeed in doing justice depends on whether people regard the remedies awarded
as sufficient to render prevailing plaintiffs even. That is, it depends on whether
their performance is persuasive.").
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III. EVALUATING THE GETTING-EVEN CONCEPTION
Having reviewed the three main objections to corrective
justice posed by civil recourse theorists and Hershovitz's
attempted rehabilitation of corrective justice in terms of
getting even, let us evaluate the getting-even conception.
This Part begins by assessing whether Hershovitz's theory
accommodates the tripartite objection posed by Zipursky and
Goldberg. Although Hershovitz's account does provide the
resources for adequate responses (once supplemented by
additional explanation), we will see that there are strong
independent reasons to reject his theory. This will help pave
the way for a better approach to corrective justice by helping
us avoid pitfalls.
A. Does Getting Even Avoid the Remedies Objection?
Recall the first civil recourse objection. It observed that
tort law allows a broad range of remedies besides
compensatory damages, even though only compensatory
damages make sense in light of the Aristotelian's duty of
repair."' Hershovitz's conception, by contrast, is far more
flexible because, on his view, getting even-or for parties to
be persuaded that they are even-might require more than
simply compensating."'6 A maliciously calculated attack
might require, for example, punitive or exemplary damages
in addition to compensatory relief.' A similar story might be
told for injunctive relief: a serial trespasser might have a
restraining order imposed on him."' This might be required
to get even.
Notice that the kind of response Hershovitz provides is
not unique to the getting-even approach. Hershovitz aims to
characterize a duty that is consistent with a broader range of
remedies beyond compensatory relief. But Hershovitz
recognizes implicitly that the only way to do this is by
increasing the level of generality at which the relevant duty
is characterized. Out goes the relatively narrow duty of
115. See discussion supra Part I.A.
116. See Hershovitz, Corrective Justice, supra note 9, at 127.
117. See id.
118. See id.
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repair. In comes the much broader duty to reach (get?) even.
And surely Hershovitz is correct to suggest that the broader
characterization is a virtue since it is consistent with a
broader range of remedies.
But we must also acknowledge that increasing the level
of generality has costs. Traditional corrective justice provides
some relatively determinate and principled standards for
evaluating remedies in tort law. To the extent that a jury
renders awards far beyond repair-based, compensatory relief
(where punitive damages are unavailable), courts are
instructed to rein in those awards."' And as John Gardner
observes, compensatory relief remains the only relief
available "as of right" in tort cases. 2 0 Increasing the level of
abstraction renders this feature of remedial practice in tort
law mysterious. Why should compensatory relief be the
default form of relief in tort law, and why are other forms so
often characterized as "extraordinary"?l21 Ironically, then,
increasing the level of generality allows Hershovitz to
accommodate more forms of relief (and thus avoid the
remedies objection), but at the apparent price of being able to
explain or justify fewer details about tort's remedial
119. Absent that, lawyers typically have solid grounds for appeal. See, e.g.,
Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 749.
120. See Gardner, Torts and Other Wrongs, supra note 8, at 62. Gardner also
examines in detail theoretical implications of private actions based in equity for
civil recourse theory and argues that equity-based claims differ fundamentally
from torts in that the former gives remedial priority to restitution and injunctive
relief, while the latter gives priority to reparations. See id. at 59.
121. For statements regarding the extraordinary nature of injunctive relief, see,
for example, United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 191 n.1 (3d Cir.
1980) (describing injunctions as an "extraordinary" form of relief); Lewis v.
Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 815 (Ill. 1999) ("A mandatory injunction is an
extraordinary remedy which may be granted when a plaintiff establishes that his
remedy at law is inadequate and that he will suffer irreparable harm without the
injunctive relief.") (emphasis added); State ex rel. Fenske v. McGovern, 464
N.E.2d 525, 528 (Ohio 1984) (describing injunctive relief as an "extraordinary
remedy"). For statements regarding the extraordinary nature of punitive
damages, see, for example, Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675,
680 (Ariz. 1986) (calling punitive damages an "extraordinary civil remedy");
Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104, 110 (Mo. 1996) ("Punitive
damages thus are like other cases requiring the clear and convincing standard of
proof: the remedy is so extraordinary or harsh that it should be applied only
sparingly.") (emphasis added).
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practices, such as the fact that compensatory damages are
the default mode of relief. 122 That is a cost Hershovitz
willingly incurs.123 Accordingly, we should conclude that the
getting-even conception does avoid the first objection as
advertised.
There is a general lesson here, which applies to any
attempt to defend corrective justice by increasing the level of
generality at which the relevant duty is described. That is,
increasing the level of generality will face the prima facie
problem of being able to explain fewer features of tort law's
remedial practices. Any account of corrective justice that de-
emphasizes repair will have to explain why this is not too
tough a pill to swallow.
B. Does Getting Even Avoid the Substantive Standing
Objection?
Hershovitz claims that the getting-even approach also
avoids the substantive standing objection, which argued that
corrective justice could not account for tort law's substantive
standing elements.12 4 The idea here was that Palsgraf, for
example, needed to do more than simply prove that the
railroad company committed a wrongdoing causally
connected to her suffering harm; she needed to show that the
122. This does not mean, however, that Hershovitz-or anyone else who prefers
the increasing-the-abstraction strategy-has no response available. It is possible
that traditional corrective justice theories view the default practice of providing
compensatory relief as far too parochial. One could imagine a tort system, quite
like ours, in which there were no kinds of remedies afforded as of right, and
according to which the question of appropriate remedies were far more up for
grabs. The fact that compensatory relief is afforded as of right, or deemed the
most important way to achieve corrective justice is, on this view, a highly
contingent artifact of the Anglo-American legal culture worthy of no special
consideration. One potential difficulty with this view is that much of tort practice
is contingent, yet we still make judgments about the relative importance of these
contingent practices that we try to nevertheless accommodate in our explanatory
theories.
123. And, as we will see in Part V, the making-amends approach also incurs this
apparent cost. See infra Part V.D.1. But it will also be explained why this is not
too tough a pill to swallow. See infra Part V.D.1.
124. Hershovitz, Corrective Justice, supra note 9, at 108; see also discussion
supra Part I.B.
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company "wronged her."l25 This criticism does not touch the
getting-even account, according to Hershovitz, since the point
of tort law is not (as per the Aristotelian conception) to make
a person whole, but rather to provide people opportunities to
get even.12 6 Substantive standing requirements determine
who "[has] cause to get even" by "pick[ing] out those who have
reason to resent, and not simply regret, a tortfeasor's
behavior."127
Hershovitz thus thinks that his account steers clear of
this objection in a way that the Aristotelian conception does
not: "The point is to give people who have been wronged an
opportunity to get even, and one has not been wronged unless
one's rights were violated. The standing requirements in tort
law attempt to pick out people who have cause to get even."'2 8
This is certainly part of the story. But only part: it is
unclear why an Aristotelian could not avail himself of
precisely the same response. Yet recall that Zipursky thought
that this kind of response was inadequate.12 9 A dilemma
purportedly befalls traditional views of corrective justice.'3 0
On the one hand, principles of corrective justice would impose
liability in cases where tort law will not. This is because,
according to Zipursky, principles of corrective justice lack the
moral equivalent to the substantive standing requirements
contained in tort doctrine: a person who is foreseeably injured
as a result of another's negligence has a genuine moral claim
for reparations against the injurer without having to
establish anything else. 3 ' But it does not accurately describe
the basic structure of tort claims, since all tort claims further
require that plaintiffs establish substantive standing. On the
other hand, principles of corrective justice that succeed in
accommodating substantive standing requirements no longer
125. Hershovitz, Corrective Justice, supra note 9, at 108.
126. Id. at 126.
127. Id. at 127.
128. Id.
129. See supra Part I.B.
130. See supra Part I.B.
131. See supra Part I.B.
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appear plausible as moral principles according to Zipursky.32
Instead, they contain technical terms like "responsibility"
that look like moral concepts, but which are only empty
vessels that contain whatever features tort law happens to
have, including substantive standing requirements.'3 3
A more complete response to Zipursky involves rejecting
his assumption that the scope of liability suggested by moral
principles of corrective justice must map perfectly onto the
scope of legal liability imposed by the substantive rules of tort
law. Corrective justice theorists need not be committed to
this position, nor does it seem a reasonable requirement that
corrective justice reflect such a mapping.
To see why, suppose, for example, that a newspaper
reporter negligently reports a story about a government
official in a way that harms his reputation severely. Morally
speaking, corrective justice might suggest that the reporter
ought to do something to compensate the official for the
harms he has suffered as a result of the negligence. But the
fact that there might be no legal liability in these
circumstances may reflect accommodations to, say, the First
Amendment. That is, there are fine-grained limitations on
liability that no theory of corrective justice could plausibly be
faulted for not "predicting," such as First Amendment
constraints on legal liability for defamation. 3 4 After all, we
should not expect a theory of corrective justice to provide a
complete theory of social or political justice or, more
narrowly, a theory of free speech. Goldberg and Zipursky's
complaint boils down, it seems, to the commonplace that the
scope of legally actionable wrongs is not coextensive with
those that are morally wrong, which is hardly a surprise,
since as a general matter what is immoral is often not
unlawful.
In the same vein, corrective justice theory does not come
with a pre-packaged theory of actionable social wrongs.
132. See supra Part I.B.
133. See supra Part I.B.
134. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (requiring a
showing not of mere negligence, but of "actual malice"-i.e., "with knowledge that
[the defamatory statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not" in order for a public official to maintain a defamation claim relating
to his official conduct).
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Corrective justice tells us what to do in the aftermath of
wrongdoing, but it does not tell us what those wrongs are.
Courts and legislatures define what wrongs are actionable in
courts, and in any event, it is obvious that not every moral
wrongdoing is legally actionable, or should be. Rules of
substantive standing are in the business of helping us
determine who has been wronged and separating them from
those who have simply suffered the unwelcome side effects of
those wrongdoings. In short, criticizing corrective justice for
failing to account for substantive standing requirements
amounts to criticizing it for failing to account for doctrinal
guides that help define, albeit imperfectly, who has been
wronged.
C. Does Getting Even Avoid the No-Legal-Duty Objection?
Now recall the no-legal-duty objection, which is that
corrective justice suggests, incorrectly, that defendants
should owe a legal duty of repair that arises immediately
upon wrongfully injuring victims, even though tort law does
not recognize any such immediate duty of repair." To bolster
this point, Zipursky claimed that tort law typically does not
award prejudgment interest, which he sees as evidence that
no legal obligation to repair or remediate arises the moment
that tortious conduct occurs.'3 6 Hershovitz claims that his
conception has the resources to respond to this objection.'3 7
But his response is incomplete and problematic in some
ways.
With his getting-even conception in tow, Hershovitz gives
the following response: corrective justice imposes a duty on
the wrongdoer to reach evenness with the victim, but the
question of what is required for the parties to reach a state of
evenness is open ended and potentially subject to negotiation
135. See supra Part I.C.
136. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 719-20 (claiming tort law is
different than a situation where "one who fails to pay under a contract will incur
prejudgment interest because payment is owed at the time the contract specifies
for performance, not at the time a court reaches a judgment").
137. See Hershovitz, Corrective Justice, supra note 9, at 109.
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with the wrongdoer.' That is, "[u]ntil a court declares that a
defendant must pay damages, the defendant is not under a
duty to do it."'3 9 This is supposed to explain why, in most tort
cases, prejudgment interest is not awarded.14 0 During the
entire prejudgment period before the verdict, the content of
the wrongdoer's duty to make things even is open-ended.141
And since the duty to reach evenness does not automatically
include a duty to compensate the victim at the moment of
wrongdoing, prejudgment interest is not awarded.142 After all,
there might not have been a duty to make things right by
compensating at all.
There are two problems with this response. The first is
that it ducks the main objection. The issue of prejudgment
interest was simply one piece of evidence marshaled to
bolster a more fundamental, structural objection by Goldberg
and Zipursky: that tort law recognizes no duty at all that
arises and attaches immediately the moment a tort occurs,
even though all corrective justice theories in the Aristotelian
tradition do recognize that the duty of repair attaches at the
moment the victim suffers wrongful losses. 143 And in response
to this deeper objection, Hershovitz has no response at all.
This is because, for Hershovitz, like the Aristotelians,
wrongdoers have duties to reach evenness that arise and
attach to them the moment they wrongfully injure another.'"
138. Id. at 128.
139. Id.
140. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 719 (claiming that "one who fails
to pay under a contract will incur prejudgment interest because payment is owed
at the time the contract specifies for performance, not at the time a court reaches
a judgment").
141. See Hershovitz, Corrective Justice, supra note 9, at 128.
142. See id. at 127-28.
143. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 720; see also Goldberg, Wrongs
Without Recourse, supra note 6, at 13 (noting that "the conversion of the moral
duty of repair into a legal duty does not happen through the tort system unless
and until the victim decides to press a claim against the defendant").
144. See Hershovitz, Corrective Justice, supra note 9, at 128 ('The duty that
arises at the moment of wrongdoing is imperfect, or open-ended; a wrongdoer
must take corrective action sufficient to support a declaration that the parties are
even.") (emphasis added).
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Hershovitz thus sides with the Aristotelians over the
civil recourse theorists when it comes to the question of when,
morally speaking, a duty arises from the point of view of
corrective justice.145  Hershovitz departs from the
Aristotelians, however, in describing the duty as "imperfect"
when the wrongdoing occurs.14 6 The precise content of the
wrongdoer's duty to the victim arises at the outcome of a
process; it is not determined automatically at the moment
when the wrongful conduct took place.147 Thus, the actual
conduct required of the wrongdoer to make things even with
the victim does not arise until the end of this negotiation
process.
But notice that this still is not wholly responsive. The
response fails to explain the fact that those who impose
wrongdoings on victims are still not under an affirmative
legal obligation to do anything about those wrongs unless the
victims prevail in lawsuits (or at least settle). Hershovitz still
claims, along with the traditional corrective justice theorists,
that a duty to get even still arises the moment the
wrongdoing occurs. And this is precisely what Goldberg and
Zipursky deny.148
Corrective justice theorists, Hershovitz included, have a
better response at their disposal, which is to reject Goldberg
and Zipursky's assumption that corrective justice implies
that there ought to be a legal duty whenever the moral duty
of repair arises.149 This is not a very charitable assumption.
Once again, a better response-though by no means
decisive-will simply point out that there are other
considerations in play whenever we are considering whether
to legally protect a moral right in general. We have moral
duties to keep promises and not to lie, other things being
equal, yet this does not mean there should be affirmative
legal obligations to refrain from lying and keep promises in
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 109, 128.
148. See supra Part I.C.
149. I am indebted to Scott Hershovitz for allowing me to see this point more
clearly.
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the same way we have affirmative legal obligations to pay
taxes. A more robust response along these lines will be
offered later on."'
So the first claim was that Hershovitz does not seem to
provide a direct response to the no-legal-duty objection. A
second problem with Hershovitz's discussion of the objection
contests his claims regarding prejudgment interest. In a
nutshell, despite Hershovitz's claim to the contrary, his
theory cannot automatically rule out awards of prejudgment
interest in tort cases.'"' That is, the getting-even conception
cannot rule out the possibility that, at least in some tort
cases, prejudgment interest should be required in order to
make the parties even.
We can see this in two ways. First, Hershovitz seems
committed to holding that civil actions arising out of contract
disputes would seemingly count as torts.'52 But once
Hershovitz concedes that civil actions arising from contract
disputes are torts, he can no longer maintain that all actions
arising in tort rule out the award of prejudgment interest.
After all, contract law explicitly allows for the award of
prejudgment interest.' Second, setting aside contract
claims, nothing in Hershovitz's theory explains why
150. See infra Part V.C.
151. Hershovitz, Corrective Justice, supra note 9, at 128.
152. At least there is no indication that he disagrees with the civil recourse
theorists on this point. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil
Recourse Revisited, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 341, 349 (2011) [hereinafter Goldberg
& Zipursky, Civil Recourse Revisited] (calling civil recourse "a broad concept"
capable of encompassing causes of action arising from breach of contract, as well
as "other domains of private law").
153. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3287(b) (West 2014) ("Every person who is
entitled under any judgment to receive damages based upon a cause of action in
contract where the claim was unliquidated, may also recover interest thereon
from a date prior to the entry of judgment as the court may, in its discretion, fix,
but in no event earlier than the date the action was filed."). Tellingly, California
starts the prejudgment-interest clock by reference to the date when the victim
makes the wrongdoer aware of the precise amount of compensatory relief
sought-not necessarily when the lawsuit was filed. See Levy-Zetner Co. v. S. Pac.
Transp. Co., 142 Cal. Rptr. 1, 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (explaining that
"prejudgment interest runs from the date when the damages are of a nature to be
certain or capable of being made certain by calculation and when the exact sum
due to the plaintiff is made known to the defendant").
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prejudgment interest should not be routinely awarded in
cases involving non-contractual torts. Suppose that, as one
commentator claims, "prejudgment interest is now widely
considered necessary to ensure full compensation to the
plaintiff and to prevent unjust enrichment of the
defendant."l 5 4 If this is correct, then Hershovitz should allow
that getting even might similarly require awarding
prejudgment interest in even run-of-the-mill torts cases.
Indeed, several jurisdictions appear to do just this:
Massachusetts awards prejudgment interest in personal
injury actions, with interest accruing from the moment the
lawsuit is filed.' California courts explicitly hold that, in
determining whether to award prejudgment interest, "the
key distinguishing factor was not . . . whether the cause of
action arose in tort or contract, but rather whether the
damages were readily ascertainable."6 The point is not
merely that some jurisdictions depart from Goldberg and
Zipursky's view that prejudgment interest is not ordinarily
awarded to successful torts plaintiffs (though, as we have
seen, a cursory search shows that there are more than simply
a few dissenting jurisdictions). 5 7 Rather, the point is that
Hershovitz's conception should not rule out, a priori, the
possibility that getting even could reasonably require
prejudgment interest in such cases, given how open-ended
the getting-even approach presents itself.
154. Michael S. Knoll, A Primer on Prejudgment Interest, 75 TEX. L. REV. 293,
298 (1996).
155. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 6B (2013) ("In any action in which a verdict is
rendered or a finding made or an order for judgment made for pecuniary damages
for personal injuries to the plaintiff or for consequential damages, or for damage
to property, there shall be added by the clerk of court to the amount of damages
interest thereon at the rate of twelve per cent per annum from the date of
commencement of the action even though such interest brings the amount of the
verdict or finding beyond the maximum liability imposed by law."), available at
http://www.malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/Partll/TitleIl/
Chapter231/Section6B.
156. Wisper Corp. v. Cal. Commerce Bank, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141, 146 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added) (quoting Levy-Zentner Co., 142 Cal. Rptr. at 23);
see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3288 (West 2014) ("In an action for the breach of an
obligation not arising from contract, and in every case of oppression, fraud, or
malice, interest may be given, in the discretion of the jury.") (emphasis added).
157. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3288; MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 231, § 6B.
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Once again, we should take a step back and consider
some general lessons. First, any theory positing that
wrongdoers have duties of redress-which arise and attach
to them the moment they wrong others-must contend with
the no-legal-duty objection. They will have to explain why
tortfeasors face no legal obligation towards their victims
until they are held liable (or settle before the imposition of
liability). Merely increasing the level of generality at which
the duty is described-e.g., as a duty to rectify instead of a
duty to repair-fails to provide the needed explanation, since
increasing the level of generality at which the duty is
described does not address the limitations on that duty-e.g.,
when that duty attaches and under what conditions.
Nor will increasing the level of generality explain why
prejudgment interest is not ordinarily awarded in torts. Once
we allow that there will be a greater range of remedies by
replacing a duty of repair with, say a duty to reach evenness,
this immediately opens up the door for awards of
prejudgment interest in tort. But, with respect to the last
point, this is potentially a virtue: at least some prominent
jurisdictions award prejudgment interest in cases arising
from non-contractual torts.'M This seems like a heartening
prediction of any corrective justice theory that seeks to re-
characterize the duty of repair in more general terms. And
these jurisdictions also arguably provide countervailing
evidence that undermines support for the no-legal-duty
objection.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that Hershovitz
has the resources to overcome the tripartite critique. In the
remaining subsections, we will see independent reasons why
we should not accept his theory.
D. Can Tort Law Help Us Get Even?
One worry with Hershovitz's view is that no amount of
relief offered by the tort system could render the victim
"even" with the wrongdoer."' Would we tell a parent who
successfully sues a drunk driver for killing her children that,
after winning a verdict, she is even? Or would it make sense
158. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3288; MASs. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 6B.
159. Hershovitz, Corrective Justice, supra note 9, at 111.
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to say to the rape victim who successfully sued her rapist that
she is even? Maybe in the eyes of the law. But suppose these
victims denied that they were even. Would they be wrong?
Hardly: denying that they are "even" would make just as
much moral sense as if they were to deny that they'd been
made "whole." Indeed, Hershovitz spends considerable time
arguing, on similar grounds, that the Aristotelian make-
whole metaphor makes no sense-and it is not obvious that
Hershovitz's get-even metaphor does any better.16 0 The
upshot is that evenness might be just as misleading as the
Aristotelian conception and for similar reasons. Often
evenness is impossible; and to the extent that the law holds
out the hope of evenness, it promises the impossible.
In reply, Hershovitz might point out that his view at least
holds a comparative advantage over the Aristotelian picture.
The Aristotelian conception promises the impossible insofar
as it is never possible, strictly speaking, to fully undo the
losses attributable to wrongdoings.' 6' There will always be
lost time, for instance, that cannot be given back to the
victim. By contrast, the Nordic cultures discussed earlier
believed that it was possible for victims to get even with
wrongdoers.162 But it is not at all clear why these other
cultures' beliefs about the possibility of "getting even" are any
more credible than the judgments of our current legal culture,
which holds that it is possible to satisfy one's duty of repair.163
In short, the claimed comparative advantage is dubious.
160. See id. at 110-17 (arguing against the Aristotelian conception of corrective
justice on the grounds that it is impossible to truly ever make a victim "whole"
again or to return the victim to the position he or she would have occupied but for
the injury).
161. Id.; see also supra Part II.B.
162. See supra Part II.B.
163. See Hershovitz, Corrective Justice, supra note 9, at 116 (claiming that
"discussions of corrective justice are chock full of qualifiers"); see, e.g., STATE OF
CONNECTICUT, CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION 3.4-1 (modified Apr. 5, 2012), available at
http://www.jud.ct.gov/jilCivil/part3/3.4-1.htm ("You must attempt to put the
plaintiff in the same position, as far as money can do it, that (he/she) would have
been in had the defendant not been negligent.") (emphasis added).
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E. Does Getting Even Involve Justice (Fit for Tort Law)?
1. An Initial Objection. Another concern with
Hershovitz's conception of corrective justice is that it ends up
licensing potentially horrific acts of vengeance-acts that
seem morally troubling to say the least. To see how, recall
that, according to Hershovitz, one unilateral way a victim can
get even with the wrongdoer is by exacting revenge on a
wrongdoer-perhaps even violent revenge.'"6 Another
exemplar of getting even includes Nordic threats of
dismemberment and the lex talionis-the "eye for an eye"-
retaliatory conception of justice.6 Hershovitz sees these not
as cases in which corrective justice has failed, but rather he
sees them as successful instances of corrective justice in
action.
The fact that the getting-even conception licenses both
revenge and the lex talionis may seem troubling. The lex
talionis, in particular, is not a morally attractive account of
justice. Consider one quick argument against the view. An
eye-for-an-eye conception of justice implies that it is just to
torture torturers or rape rapists. But doing these things
seems deeply unjust. Assuming that no plausible conception
of justice should legitimize such morally horrifying acts, we
should not endorse the lex talionis. The fact that Hershovitz's
getting-even theory legitimizes revenge and the lex talionis,
at least in certain circumstances, should make us worry.166
164. Hershovitz, Corrective Justice, supra note 9, at 122 (noting that getting
even "in the classic sense" means that someone "can seek revenge").
165. Id. at 123. Hershovitz states:
The Icelanders in the story did not regard taking an eye for an eye as the
recipe for corrective justice, akin to the Aristotelian proposal that
wrongful transactions should be reversed. For them, an eye for an eye
was a failsafe. It provided a way of doing justice unilaterally, which was
important in a world without tort law. But an eye for an eye was also
what economists call a penalty default rule, encouraging wrongdoers to
take their victim's claims seriously.
Id.
166. Although Jeremy Waldron does not endorse this argument against the lex
talionis, he states it succinctly in his Lex Talionis, 34 ARiz. L. REV. 25 (1992). He
said:
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But this argument is surely too quick. Hershovitz would
reject the idea that the getting-even conception, under all
circumstances, straightforwardly endorses lex talionis or
revenge as appropriate modes of justice. Recall that there
were constraints on whether two parties could be rendered
even with each other.6 7 Some of these restrictions were moral
constraints. 6  And whether it makes sense, morally
speaking, to unilaterally seek revenge or seek the protection
of the lex talionis depends on facts about the society in which
a victim seeks justice. In a lawless society, perhaps unilateral
acts of revenge are legitimate options for achieving justice; in
primitive societies where the lex talionis is the only option,
maybe private, unilateral revenge will no longer be
available-instead, the right thing to do to get even is to find
an oddman.169 And maybe in modern societies, getting even
cannot be accomplished through either the lex talionis or
unilateral acts of revenge, given the other options available-
like the tort system. So even though Hershovitz uses revenge
and the lex talionis to illustrate the getting-even conception,
he has room to claim that his conception need not license, say,
raping rapists or torturing torturers-or any other morally
horrifying act of retaliation. His view is flexible enough to
allow this response.
Though the principle retains its attraction for defenders of capital
punishment ("a life for a life"), people think they can discredit it almost
immediately by asking "What penalty is to be imposed on the rapist,
according to this principle?" Amidst the general hilarity that follows, the
speaker is able to put LT [lex talionis] quietly to one side and move on,
as he thinks, to some more plausible version of retributivism.
Id. at 25. Jeffrey Reiman offers a version of this argument, allowing that the lex
talionis indeed states a form of justice, but nevertheless insisting that some of its
implications are deeply immoral. See Jeffrey H. Reiman, Justice, Civilization, and
the Death Penalty: Answering van den Haag, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 115, 134-35
(1985) (arguing that, even though the lex talionis "proves the justice of beating
assaulters, raping rapists, and torturing torturers ... it would not be right for us
to beat assaulters, rape rapists, or torture torturers, even though it were their just
deserts-and even if this were the only way to make them suffer as much as they
had made their victims suffer").
167. See supra Part II.A.
168. See supra Part II.A.
169. See supra Part II.B.
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But his view is not endlessly flexible-otherwise it would
be vacuous. He is still committed to the view that revenge,
the lex talionis, and tort suits have the same point or goal.170
He states this explicitly, and it is hard to overstate the
importance of this claim for Hershovitz's view. Indeed, the
claim that the point that revenge and tort law have the same
aim-to allow victims to get even with wrongdoers-is what
makes Hershovitz's claim so novel and provocative. But as
we will see in the next subsection, it is precisely this view
that makes Hershovitz's theory so problematic as an
explanatory account of tort law.
2. Explanatory Difficulties for Getting Even. The idea
that the lex talionis and tort law have the same purpose-to
allow a victim of wrongdoing to get even with the
wrongdoer-undermines Hershovitz's theory as an
explanatory theory of tort law, insofar as it distorts rather
than illuminates key features of tort law. To see why, notice
that the lex talionis and revenge are typically regarded as
practices that aim to punish wrongdoers.17 1 Jeremy Waldron,
for example, interprets the lex talionis as a view about
punishment.1 72 And in a widely anthologized work on the
death penalty, Jeffrey Reiman goes to great length to clarify
and understand the lex talionis as a theory of retributive, not
corrective, justice.' Suffice it to say that the lex talionis is
widely understood as, at best, a theory of justice fit for
punishment-i.e., a theory of retributive justice.
Importantly, if we accept this natural understanding of
the lex talionis as a practice that aims to punish, and acts of
revenge as acts of punishment, then this raises problems for
the getting-even theory as an explanatory theory of tort law
in at least two important ways.
170. Hershovitz, What Does Tort Law Do?, supra note 94, at 117 ("A tort suit is
not an act of revenge. But it aims to do the same thing that people taking revenge
aim to do. That is, a tort suit aims to render wrongdoer and victim even in respect
of the wrong.").
171. See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 166, at 25.
172. See id. (calling the lex talionis an "approach to punishment").
173. See Reiman, supra note 166, at 119 ("The lex talionis is a version of
retributivism.").
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The first way that the getting-even conception distorts
tort law is by rendering mysterious the way tort law awards
damages. More precisely, if the goal of tort law, revenge, and
the lex talionis are all the same, and if that aim is
punishment of wrongdoers, then tort law's default remedy
should be punitive rather than compensatory damages.17 4
True, tort law does permit punitive damages. But punitive
damages are not the default mode of redress in tort law.'
Punitive damages are viewed as extraordinary and rare
remedies to be afforded in extreme cases only-they are
certainly not afforded "as of right."7 6 But Hershovitz's
account renders this fact strange. At the very least, his
account suggests that punitive relief should not be viewed as
so "extraordinary" if tort law aims to afford victims the
opportunity to get even with wrongdoers.
Secondly, and relatedly, if the goal of tort law is the same
as revenge or the lex talionis, then tort law seems somewhat
redundant. After all, we already have a system of law devoted
to meting out retributive justice-namely, criminal law.
True, there might be different ways of securing retributive
justice based on the perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing
and the entity charged with enforcement. As to the latter,
prosecutors are charged with pursuing criminal justice in the
name of the public, whereas the victim pursues justice in tort
law on her own behalf. Still, understanding corrective justice
as simply another way of pursuing retributive justice blurs
the distinction between tort law and criminal law. '1 And if
174. I thank Greg Keating for pressing me to develop this point further.
175. See supra Part I.A.
176. See Gardner, Torts and Other Wrongs, supra note 8, at 53-55.
177. See, e.g., WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 172-73. Weinrib
states:
Corrective justice rectifies injustices that operate on the parties in a
transactionally specific way .. . linking two specific parties through the
injury . . . . Punishment is different. It is state action that inflicts an
adverse consequence on the wrongdoer without restoring the right of a
wronged party. When the state punishes, it acts not to rectify a wrong
that is transactionally specific to the plaintiff and the defendant, but to
vindicate its own standing as the public guarantor of rightful order.
Id.
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one of the chief aims of theorizing about tort law is to
illuminate how tort law is a distinctive branch of law, then
the fact that Hershovitz's approach blurs the boundaries
counts as a demerit to his view as an explanatory theory. Tort
law would be, arguably, criminal law by other means. "
Of course, neither of these explanatory problems is very
problematic if Hershovitz presents a revisionist, rather than
explanatory, account of tort law. But if he seeks to explain
many of tort law's main features in terms of getting even,
construing tort law as sharing the same aim as revenge or
the lex talionis is more confusing than illuminating. And this
is because, it seems, these practices do not seem to have the
same aim.
Despite these shortcomings, the getting-even theory
paves the way to a broader conception of corrective justice
that will be called the "making amends" approach. Let us
turn to this conception below.
IV. THE MAKING AMENDS APPROACH
The previous section posed problems for Hershovitz's
getting-even account of corrective justice. But his account
nevertheless yields important insights. He correctly shows,
for example, that to accommodate the remedies objection, we
will need to describe the relevant duty at a higher level of
abstraction. After all, some remedies are not in the business
of repair; some are punitive and others are nominal, and the
duty must be described broadly enough to capture these facts.
Instead of a duty to repair, the new approach describes
the duty relevant to corrective justice as the duty to make
amends. This duty is part of a principle that holds, roughly,
that corrective justice occurs when and only when a person
responsible for wrongs that befall others (the "victims")
178. The same objection has been made against civil recourse theory-i.e., the
positive theory of tort law put forward by Goldberg and Zipursky, which has
received little attention in this paper. See, e.g., Jane Stapleton, Evaluating
Goldberg and Zipursky's Civil Recourse Theory, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1529, 1559-
60 (2006). See generally Gardner, Torts and Other Wrongs, supra note 8 (arguing
at length that civil recourse theory fails to illuminate how tort law is
distinguishable from several other areas of private law).
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makes amends to those victims. By focusing on making
amends, we can make substantial progress in formulating an
account of corrective justice that helps explain the structure
of tort law and rebuts the other criticisms of the classical
views encountered in Part I.179
A. Making Amends: A Preliminary Sketch
1. Wrongs and Responsibility. Someone who is
responsible for a wrong that befalls another, a victim, has a
duty to make amends to that victim. The first thing to notice
about this claim is that it incorporates some notion of
responsibility: X's making amends to Y makes sense only if X
is responsible for a wrong that has occured to Y. Suppose that
Bill is struck by lightning. Now suppose that, upon hearing
the news, Albert tries to make amends for Bill's lightning-
induced harms. This makes no sense unless Albert is
somehow responsible for the harms. In general, a person can
make amends to another only if that person is in some sense
responsible for an unwelcome event that happens to another
person.'8 0
This raises two further questions. First, what kind of
unwelcome events count as a wrong, and second, what kind
of action makes a person responsible for the wrongs that
befall another person? As to the first question, recall that
corrective justice concerns the norms that govern in the
aftermath of wrongdoing, but it does not supply, nor should
179. At this point, it is worth quickly mentioning the methodology used in
investigating the idea of making amends. The author follows more or less a
standard philosophical approach in coming up with his account of the concept of
making amends. The approach involves proposing explicit principles or criteria
that govern our understanding of a given concept, and which adequately reflect
or capture certain "truisms" or platitudes about the concept that should be
relatively uncontroversial. For more detailed discussion of an approach in the
same spirit, see SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 13-22 (2011).
180. Notice, by the way, that this observation immediately rules out the version
of the Tom and Jerry case in which Tom and Jerry declare themselves even with
each other with respect to a pre-existing debt between them. Hershovitz,
Corrective Justice, supra note 9, at 118-19. This did not seem like a case involving
corrective justice in any event; the fact that the making amends view fails to
account for it should be regarded as a benefit of the view. Making amends applies
only in cases where someone has wronged another.
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it supply, a complete theory of what counts as morally wrong,
or what ought to be legally recognized as a wrong. So the fact
that this article does not aim to provide a full-fledged theory
of wrongs should come as no surprise.
That said, we can still say a little about the formal nature
of wrongs presupposed by the making amends theory. There
is, for example, one important limitation on how broadly we
should understand the wrongs relevant to making amends,
which is that making amends involves, as Goldberg and
Zipursky point out, "relational wrongs.""' The idea is that
some wrongs injure a particular victim, as opposed to being
wrongs as such.'8 2 The process of making amends
presupposes, as pointed out in the previous paragraph, that
the wrong connects a victim with someone who is in some
sense responsible for the wrong. Driving drunk is a
wrongdoing even if there is no victim. Involuntary
manslaughter is a relational wrongdoing given that
describing the act necessarily involves mentioning a victim.
Making amends necessarily involves the responsible party
making amends to someone.'3 Accordingly, the wrongs
relevant in the making amends process are always relational
wrongs, relating a responsible party to an identifiable
victim.184
Turning to the second question-concerning the relation
of being responsible for that corrective justice presupposes-
this arguably is something that a full-fledged theory of
corrective justice must grapple with. Indeed, many corrective
181. Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 4, at 945-53; see also
Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, supra note 26, at 60-64.
182. Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 4, at 945-46.
183. See id.
184. See id. Linda Radzik endorses the conception of making amends according
to which it seems that wrongdoers have a duty to make amends for non-relational
wrongs. See LINDA RADZIK, MAKING AMENDS 135-39 (2009). Radzik deserves
recognition as one of the few, if not only, contemporary philosophers who have
focused squarely on the topic of making amends. But I do not accept all of her
analysis.
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justice theorists have discussed the topic at length.' And
surely the notion (or notions) of responsibility embedded in
our practices of making amends is likewise an important
topic. One worry is that the concept of responsibility papers
over the real criteria determining whether one may fairly be
held accountable. Is one "responsible" for all the harms that
foreseeably injure others as a result of one's misconduct? If
so, this might be problematic if the principle aims to explain
tort law, since very often a person is not liable despite being
"responsible" for the harmful consequences of their action in
this sense.18 6 Moreover, regardless of how the concept of
responsibility is specified, the moral principle proposed here
poses problems because we should not hold those who truly
lack capacity morally responsible for their actions. Expecting
a truly insane person to have the capacity to make amends
would seem unreasonable. Yet tort law does not recognize an
insanity defense.'8 7
This article will not take up these important issues. For
present purposes, we will not attempt to articulate or rely on
any particular theory of responsibility in order to make sense
of corrective justice. The limited goal of this article will be to
articulate and defend a more expansive conception of
corrective justice that is not vulnerable to the objections of
185. See, e.g., COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 1, at 197-385; Stephen
R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY
AND THE LAW OF TORTS 131-82 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001).
186. See supra Part I.B. (discussing the dilemma that played a crucial role in
the substantive standing objection).
187. James Goudkamp, Insanity as a Tort Defense, 31 OXFORD J. L. STUD. 727,
727-28 (2011) (recognizing that "[aill of the major common law jurisdictions
withhold insanity as an answer to liability in tort" but proceeding to argue against
this practice). Courts do, however, make accommodations for defendants lacking
certain capacities. Blind people, for example, are not held to the same standard
of care applicable to defendants with fully functioning eyesight. See ARTHUR BEST
& DAVID W. BARNES, BASIC TORT LAw: CASES, STATUTES, AND PROBLEMS 112 (2d ed.
2007). Best and Barnes state:
Exceptions to the reasonable person standard developed when the
individual whose conduct was alleged to have been negligent suffered
from some physical impairment, such as blindness, deafness, or
lameness. Courts also found it necessary, as a practical matter, to depart
considerably from the objective standard when dealing with children's
behavior.
Id.
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Goldberg and Zipursky. And this can be done, as we will see,
without signing on to a fully fleshed out theory of
responsibility.
2. Conciliatory Gestures. The claim so far is that those
who are responsible for wrongs that befall victims have a
duty to make amends to those victims. Now let us consider
the nature of making amends itself. How do those responsible
for wrongs make amends? Making amends requires, we
claim, a certain kind of conciliatory gesture by the responsible
party toward the victim.
To unpack this claim, let us begin with the gesture
requirement. That is, in order to make amends, some sort of
act performed for the victim is required. To see why, consider
Albert and Bill. Suppose that Albert is responsible for
wrongful conduct that injures Bill, and that Albert claims to
have made amends to Bill. Now suppose Charlie asks Albert
how Albert made amends. In reply, Albert says he felt guilty
about the wrongdoing and recognized that he should not have
done it, but confesses that he did nothing for Bill. Albert, for
instance, never apologized to Bill. In fact, Albert and Bill
have had no contact with each other since the wrongdoing
occurred; Bill does not even know that Albert felt guilty about
the wrongdoing.
In these circumstances, Albert's claim to have made
amends to Bill is false. Albert is making a mistake about the
nature of making amends. Feeling guilty about a wrongdoing
and wishing it had never happened does not suffice to make
amends.'" These are appropriate attitudes to have in
response to a wrongdoing. But the proper vehicle for
expressing these attitudes is some sort of gesture performed
for the victim.
As for the kind of gesture: making amends, like
Hershovitz's notion of getting even, has a built-in flexibility.
There is no detailed recipe on how to make amends in any
given case. But this flexibility has limits. Not any gesture will
do. The gesture should be, as just mentioned, conciliatory
(rather than, say, insulting). The very word used to describe
188. Radzik points out that certain theological conceptions of making amends
come close to holding that sincere repentance is sufficient to atone for one's sins.
Linda Radzik, Making Amends, 41 AM. PHIL. Q. 141, 142-44 (2004). Radzik and I
agree that, for worldly purposes, private atonement is not enough. See id.
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the gesture, "conciliatory," suggests that the wrongdoer has
a duty to reconcile or at least seek a reconciliation of sorts
with the victim. There is some truth here. But we should be
careful not to over-emphasize the notion of reconciliation.
Conciliatory gestures need not aim to reconcile victim and
wrongdoer, and a conciliatory gesture can succeed in making
amends without achieving any recognizable reconciliation.
Very often victim and wrongdoer have no prior relationship
to restore and no relationship other than one that exists
between victim and wrongdoer. Hence, what makes an act
conciliatory in the relevant sense is not that it aims to restore
a prior relationship. Instead, a gesture counts as conciliatory
in the intended sense if it suggests or expresses regret on the
part of the wrongdoer to the victim that the wrongdoing had
occurred.
This last observation-that the act must be understood
to signal regret by the wrongdoer that the injury occurred-
is a potential source of confusion. It may be taken to suggest
that a wrongdoer must subjectively feel regret for the
wrongdoing in order for the gesture to count as conciliatory.
And ideally, a wrongdoer should feel some regret. But the
idea of a conciliatory gesture contemplated here is wholly
objective. To illustrate, suppose that Hatfield wrongs McCoy
in some way and thereby incurs a duty to make amends to
McCoy. Hatfield knows that the right thing to do is to make
amends by, say, apologizing and offering up some fresh
vegetables from his garden. Now suppose that, because
Hatfield and McCoy are mortal enemies, Hatfield cannot
bring himself to regret the wrongdoing. Hatfield's dour
attitude does not prevent Hatfield from fulfilling his
obligation to make amends. All that matters is that the
gesture be reasonably recognizable as one that signals regret,
even if, subjectively, wrongdoers like Hatfield cannot bring
themselves to actually experience that regret. Hatfield can
fulfill his moral obligation to make amends even if he does so
grudgingly, just like he can satisfy his legal obligation to pay
his taxes even if he does so grudgingly.
So how do we know whether the gesture recognizably
signals regret, given that wrongdoers need not actually feel
any regret? The act should be a reasonable and adequate
response by those responsible for the wrongful losses of
others. We say reasonable and adequate because conciliatory
2014] 495
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gestures might be reasonable but wholly inadequate if taken
alone. An apology is almost always a reasonable response to
a wrongdoing.'8 9 Sincere apologies are almost always more
effective. But often an apology is not enough given the
severity of the harm done.190 Sometimes making amends will
involve literally mending broken fences or paying for the
damage done by one's wrongful conduct. Monetary
reparations are simply one way of performing this kind of
gesture. And sometimes, for particularly heinous
wrongdoings, making amends requires submitting to
punishment.19' The main takeaway point is that making
amends might require a broad range of appropriate
responses, which are sensitive to, among other things, the
nature of the wrong. 192
To be sure, although making amends seems to include
more (or less) than reparations, some have taken the phrase
"making amends" to be synonymous with making
189. Scott Hershovitz recognizes that gestures beyond compensation-such as
apologies-might be a part of making amends and comes close to identifying
making amends with corrective justice. See Hershovitz, Harry Potter, supra note
8, at 96. But he never explicitly considers this possibility at length. See id.
("[A] part from law, explanation and apology are at least as central to our practice
of making amends as monetary compensation is. The question we need to answer,
however, is whether explanation and apology are also matters of corrective
justice.").
190. Making amends is a prominent theme in addiction-recovery practices,
which view making amends as potentially more than simply providing
compensation. See, e.g., HAZELDEN, Making Amends is More Than an Apology,
http://www.hazelden.org/web/public/has703O5.page (last visited July 16, 2012).
191. See id. ("Remember that with crimes such as drunk driving, people might
need to go to court and take a punishment. That's part of making amends as
well.").
192. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) associates the phrase "making
amends" either with "[r]eparation, retribution, restitution, compensation,
satisfaction." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 68, at 385. Notice first that
the words listed as associated with "making amends" include "restitution",
"compensation", and "reparation." Id. Although we should be careful not to
confuse dictionary definitions with deep normative truths or fully accurate
descriptions of complex moral phenomena, the OED does provide some evidence
that making amends potentially involves more than simply a narrow form of
reparations.
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reparations.193 This suggests that the duty of repair just is the
duty to make amends. But we should resist conflating these
two ideas. For one thing, the phrase "making amends" often
amounts to little more than loose talk when it occurs in the
literature on corrective justice.194 More importantly, our
ordinary understanding of making amends seems a much
broader moral notion and includes a greater variety of
responses to wrongdoing than the narrower notion of a duty
to repair.
But this does not mean that we ought to jettison the
Aristotelian's duty of repair. The notion of conciliatory
gestures contemplated here provides a useful lens through
which to view traditional corrective justice theory.
Traditional corrective justice theories go wrong insofar as
they claim that the duty of repair is the one and only duty
associated with corrective justice.195 But the relevant duty is
broader than a reparative one. It is a duty to make amends,
one essential ingredient of which is a conciliatory gesture. In
turn, a gesture counts as conciliatory only if it is recognizable
as suggesting some regret that the wrong took place.
As it turns out, however, there is often no better way of
expressing or suggesting regret than by trying to actually
undo the damage done as a result of wrongdoing-at least to
a reasonable extent. If A accidentally pushes B to the ground,
there is no better way to express regret for this occurrence
than for A to try to help B up off the ground. The mistake is
to think that this is the only way to signal regret.
193. See, e.g., ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 104
(1999) (describing one view as holding that "if I injure someone through my
carelessness, and should have foreseen that injury, I can be forced to make
appropriate amends, as judged by a court of law') (emphasis added); Jules L.
Coleman, Epilogue to Risks and Wrongs: Second Edition 30 (Yale Law Sch. Pub.
Law Working Paper No. 218), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1679554 (referring to a duty to "make amends or
repair") (emphasis added). Civil recourse theorists do the same. See Goldberg,
Wrongs Without Recourse, supra note 6, at 13 ("In other words, if the defendant
is going to be made to heed his duty of repair, it will only be by virtue of the law's
having empowered the victim to demand of the defendant that he make amends
for the wrong done.") (emphasis added).
194. See sources cited supra note 193.
195. See, e.g., Hershovitz, Corrective Justice, supra note 9, at 116-17 (describing
Aristotelian theories).
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We are very close to returning to tort law. But let us take
stock by articulating some principles that capture the
making-amends conception of corrective justice. Consider a
first approximation, called the Making Amends (First Pass)
or the First Pass principle:
Making Amends (First Pass): Individuals who have
relationally wronged others (victims) have a duty to make
amends to those victims.
This principle captures the observations made so far
about making amends. Making amends to person X is
something that one must do if one has wronged X. The notion
of wronging others, however, must be viewed both
expansively and restrictively. Understanding the notion of
wronging others expansively means not only that X wrongs Y
in run-of-the-mill cases in which X's direct and wrongful
conduct injures Y, but also in cases where we can reasonably
impute to X responsibility for wrongs that befall Y. By
emphasizing relational wrongs, the principle should be
understood to restrict the class of wrongdoings; it is not
enough for a wrongdoing to exist "in the air" so to speak. The
wrong must be a wrong to another person.
We might make these points more explicit by offering the
following revised principle, sacrificing concision for precision:
Making Amends (Second Pass): Individuals who have
relationally wronged others (victims), or are otherwise
responsible for the wrongs that befall victims, have a duty to
make amends to those victims.
The new, italicized clause makes explicit the point just
mentioned. Either we read X wronging Y broadly to include
X being responsible for (in some unspecified sense) Y's
injuries, or if that seems to stretch too far the notion of one
person wronging another, then we offer instead the Second
Pass principle. The wrongs in any event must still be
relational wrongs that render some individuals victims.
Given that making amends just is performing a
reasonable and adequate conciliatory gesture under
appropriate circumstances, we might make the principle
even more explicit:
Making Amends (Third Pass): Individuals who have
wronged others (victims), or are otherwise responsible for the
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wrongs that befall victims, have a duty to perform a
reasonable and adequate conciliatory gesture to those
victims.
The duty to make amends, on this explication, has been
satisfied once the responsible party performs a reasonable
and adequate conciliatory gesture to the victim or victims.
This does not require, as already noted, any full
reconciliation. Full "reconciliation" between victim and
wrongdoer-whatever that may entail-is not a prerequisite
for making amends. Nor does it, as already discussed, require
any particular feelings of remorse or guilt on behalf of the
wrongdoer. The gesture must, however, be reasonably
recognizable as expressing regret that the wrong occurred. In
turn, this requires that the gesture be adequate or
proportional in relation to the gravity of the wrongdoing that
has occurred.
So far we have roughly sketched an account of the duty
to make amends, the circumstances under which it is
triggered, and what making amends actually involves (a
reasonable and adequate conciliatory gesture to the victims
of the wrongs by those who own the wrong). And we have
tried to explicate these ideas. The resulting principle of
making amends-the Third Pass-is less concise but
somewhat more precise than the First Pass principle. But the
Third Pass still omits an important dimension of making
amends, which is that there are limits on the duty to make
amends.
3. Limits on Making Amends. The duty to make amends
is a duty. And like most moral duties there are limits that
apply. The moral duty to make amends does not apply, in
other words, in any and all circumstances. To see why, notice
that it often makes very little moral sense for someone who
is responsible for another's wrong to try to make amends.
Sometimes this is a consequence of what we observed in the
preceding paragraph: making amends requires the
responsible party to have some kind of interaction with the
person wronged, in the form of a conciliatory gesture. And
depending on the nature of the wrong, and the burdens on
the victim, an attempt by the wrongdoer to make amends
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might simply add insult to injury.1 96 As Linda Radzik
correctly notes, encouraging a child molester to try to patch
things up with his victims is ill-advised and morally
dubious-especially if the molester's idea of making amends
includes private, face-to-face interactions. 197 The victim may
want no further interaction with his injurer whatsoever.
And this observation is not a special or extreme case.
Some people may simply wish to move on with their lives and
do not wish to revisit a painful past. And the process of
making amends can be quite taxing on the victim. To avoid
adding insult to injury, or if not insult then unwanted
burdens, ideally victims should have some control over the
amends-making process regarding whether, when, and how
the process of making amends should go forward.
With this in mind, let us revise the making amends
principle:
Making Amends (Fourth Pass): Individuals who have
wronged others (victims), or are otherwise responsible for
wrongs that befall victims, have a duty to perform a
reasonable and adequate conciliatory gesture to those
victims, only if those victims want the wrongdoer (or
responsible party) to make amends.
The "only if' clause here tries to capture the idea that it's
the victim's prerogative to determine whether amends-
making proceeds. The injurer's duty to make amends to the
victim is contingent on the victim's wanting the wrongdoer to
make amends.
196. I am indebted to Linda Radzik's work for emphasizing this point. See
Radzik, supra note 188, at 146; see also RADZIK, supra note 184, at 84. Radzik does
not appear to suggest, however, that the duty to make amends-or "atone" in her
words-can be turned off by the interests of the victim. She instead suggests that,
when making amends is unwelcome by the victim, the wrongdoer should redirect
that energy towards reconciling with the community at large. See RADZIK, supra
note 184, at 84 (claiming that, even in cases where the wrongdoer should not
make personal gestures to the victim, "[t]here is still important work for
atonement to do ... to achieve reconciliation with the broader community"). This
seems a good idea, morally, but does not amount to making amends with the
victim, which is the conception of amends-making that I focus on, and which is
the conception of the amends-making process relevant to tort law.
197. Id.
500 [Vol. 62
MAKING AMENDS
4. Obstacles to Making Amends. We noticed that one's
duty to make amends to a victim is contingent on the victim's
desires and that this places the wrongdoer in a tricky position
if he genuinely wishes to make amends. Although figuring
out what the victim wants is often easy to work out,
sometimes it is not. To figure out what the victim wants,
maybe the wrongdoer should simply ask. Many times this
makes sense. But even asking might be an unwelcome
gesture. Recall that the victim of molestation may want no
interaction with the wrongdoer, and even asking may
contravene the victim's wishes.
But this is just one possible obstacle in the amends-
making process, and perhaps a small one. The most obvious
impediment is disagreement. The injurer might disagree
with the victim as to whether he is responsible for a
wrongdoing. And even if the injurer concedes wrongdoing,
she might disagree with the victim over what conciliatory
gesture will suffice. The victim might want something other
than what the injurer is willing to provide.
Other obstacles abound. There are epistemic problems.
The victim might not know who the injurer is. This is often
the case during hit-and-runs. Likewise, the injurer might not
know who the victim is. A factory that leaks toxic chemicals
may not find out for many years that a cluster of birth defects
is attributable to that spill, and on the flipside, those who
suffer from the defects may not have a clue what caused
them. Or the injurer might simply not know he has
committed a wrong, as is the case with an innocent trespass
over land that the trespasser mistakenly thought was public.
How do we overcome these and other obstacles and
difficulties in the amends-making process? No more
amendments to the moral amends-making principle will be
offered. Perhaps further refinement is possible, but these
problems are likely to persist despite them. These are
practical and epistemic difficulties that are not resolvable by
specification of a moral principle. They are problems that
arise in relation to efforts to enforce or realize that moral
principle by either the injurer or the victim.
To illustrate, suppose we have a perfect specification of
the moral principle of making amends. Once we are told that
the principle has an "escape" clause-that our duties to make
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amends are contingent on whether others want us to make
amends-wrongdoers may shy away from making amends by
convincing themselves that everyone will be better off if
everyone simply avoids the amends-making process. "If the
victims really thought about it," wrongdoers tell themselves,
"they would realize that dredging up old wrongs does nobody
any good." And this thought is not entirely without reason.
Economists have a label for this idea-a "sunk cost"-and
economically rational agents never take sunk costs into
consideration.198 Sometimes the best response to a wrong
might be for everyone to just move on. This shows that, even
if we manage to arrive at a perfect formulation of the duty to
make amends, practical problems of application of that
principle still arise. The fact that the moral process of making
amends faces so many obstacles may not be reassuring. But
these difficulties are important for understanding the
relationship that tort law bears to making amends.
This sketch of the informal, moral process of making
amends leaves many questions unanswered. Are sincere
apologies by wrongdoers vital? Is making amends
tantamount to a kind of atonement? Although the author is
inclined to answer 'no' to these questions, no arguments on
these points will be offered here. It should be noted that
Linda Radzik is one of the few to face these issues head on in
her work.199 My own analysis of making amends does not
appear to conflict with the broad contours of her view.
By the same token, we should not endorse everything
Radzik claims about the morality of making amends either.
Radzik presupposes far more than we should be prepared to
accept. For one thing, her views are shaped by a particular
expressive theory of the nature of moral wrongdoing, a theory
that arguably overgeneralizes based on cases of intentional
wrongdoings and that will therefore have trouble capturing
cases of negligence that are the bread and butter of tort
198. But see R. Preston McAffee et al., Do Sunk Costs Matter?, 48 EcON. INQUIRY
323-36 (2010) (describing sunk costs as costs that cannot be recovered, describing
the conventional economic perspective that holds that rational actors ignore sunk
costs in making decisions, and arguing within an economic framework that
reflecting on sunk costs may be rational under certain constraints).
199. See RADZIK, supra note 184; see also Radzik, supra note 188, at 146.
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lawsuits.2 00 Making amends, however, is broader than that
and can also capture our morally appropriate responses to
accidents. 2 0 1 Also worrisome is Radzik's claim that the goal of
making amends is reconciliation between wrongdoers and
their victims, which implies that making amends fails
whenever it falls short of actual reconciliation.2 0 2 Although we
agree that making amends involves a conciliatory gesture, we
were also careful to distance this concept from the idea of
reconciliation, especially given that strangers who may have
no interest in reconciling can still make amends. A full
defense of these views will not be offered here. But hopefully
the preliminary sketch outlined above will play a useful role
in helping to explain tort law, a project that follows below.
B. Making Amends Through Tort Law
The previous subsection analyzed the duty to make
amends in terms of what triggers the duty, some of its limits,
and certain practical obstacles to making amends. The
present proposal in this subsection is that tort law aims to
facilitate the amends-making process by mitigating these
obstacles, while protecting victims' morally important
interests in controlling certain aspects of the amends-making
process. The making-amends conception of tort law-as
opposed to those provided by pragmatic conceptualists like
Coleman and Zipursky2 0 3-is thus an instrumentalist
explanation. As such, any mismatch between the structure of
the moral principle of making amends and normative
structure of tort law is not necessarily a detriment to the
explanation on offer. The goal of the following explanation is
to show how any lack of "fit" between moral principles of
200. RADZIK, supra note 184, at 76-80.
201. Section B below will take on the question of the nature of wrongs
presupposed in tort law in greater detail.
202. See generally RADZIK, supra note 184. Wrongdoers, it seems, can
successfully make amends without any reconciliation with the victim by
performing a reasonable and adequate conciliatory gesture. But this claim will
not be defended here.
203. COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 1 at 25-63; Zipursky, Civil
Recourse, supra note 2, at 703-09; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic
Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 457, 457-85 (Jules L. Coleman et al. eds., 2000)
[hereinafter Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism].
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making amends and tort law's basic normative structure can
be explained in terms of the law's attempt to overcome certain
practical obstacles to the amends-making process. Some
mismatch is to be expected. Perhaps the best way to see how
tort law mitigates obstacles to achieving corrective justice-
or making amends-is by considering the obstacles that
prevent people from making amends and how the institution
of tort law is designed to correct for those failures.
1. The Problem of Disagreement. As already noted,
probably the most obvious obstacle to making amends is
disagreement. Sometimes the wrongdoer denies being
responsible for any wrong. Other times he denies committing
a wrong with respect to the putative victim. And even if there
is no disagreement about whether an injurious wrong has
occurred, or whether the putative injurer has the right
relationship of ownership toward the wrong, there still may
be disagreement about what kind of conciliatory gesture is
adequate.
Tort law addresses all of these issues. It defines the
conduct and injuries that qualify as actionable wrongs. 2 04
True, the law does not make actionable all injurious
wrongdoings. A threshold of importance must be met.205 The
law does not generally concern itself, for example, with de
minimis wrongs. 2 06 Furthermore, because tort law aims to
facilitate the amends-making process, and because making
amends is something that a wrongdoer does with respect to
the person he has wronged, tort law also has features that
ensure that the putative victim is in fact a genuine victim of
the wrongdoer's wrongful conduct. This point is an important
one that we will return to when we discuss the substantive
standing requirement. As we will see, the point of these
requirements is at least in part to ensure that the litigants
204. John Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1. The Place of Corrective
Justice, 30 LAw & PHIL. 1, 50 (2011) [hereinafter Gardner, What is Tort Law For?]
("Private law can (and may be needed to) make such obligations more determinate
than they would be in their raw moral form, but it is not needed to bring them
into existence in the first place.").
205. See, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir.
1997).
206. Id. ("The legal maxim 'de minimis non curat lex' (sometimes rendered, 'the
law does not concern itself with trifles') insulates from liability those who cause
insignificant violations of the rights of others.").
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stand in the proper amends-making relationship that tort
law aims to facilitate. Why this is important will also be
discussed in greater detail below.
Another source of disagreement relates to conciliatory
gestures. Although a reasonable and adequate conciliatory
gesture is required, what counts as reasonable and adequate
might be a source of disagreement. Tort law helps smooth
over these difficulties as well by providing a set of off-the-
rack remedies, the most important being the default rule of
compensatory damages.2 07 Different jurisdictions differ on the
details, but the civil recourse theorists are correct to point out
that the kinds of remedies involve at least compensatory and
punitive damages, as well as many forms of injunctive
relief.208
In summary, tort law settles disagreements about what
conduct constitutes a wrong in an important class of cases
and disagreements about who qualifies as a genuine victim
of those wrongdoings. Tort law accomplishes this by
providing off-the-rack categories of relational wrongs to
potential plaintiffs and a menu of potential remedies.
2. Victim Control. There is another important moral
problem on the horizon, relating to victims' morally
important interests in exerting some control over the
amends-making process-i.e., whether the wrongdoer should
make amends and how that process takes place. Consider
Carol and Will. Carol has wronged Will, but Will simply does
not want to have any further contact with Carol. Will, in
short, does not want Carol to make amends. On the amends-
making view, this means Carol has no duty to make amends
with Will. But suppose that Carol, for whatever reason, still
wants to make some conciliatory gesture to Will. Maybe she
feels guilty or believes (incorrectly) that she still has to make
it up to Will in some way. In any event, by unilaterally
deciding to approach Will, Carol is making an unwelcome
gesture and depriving Will of some degree of control over the
amends-making process. This is so regardless of whether
Carol's gesture ultimately succeeds in making things better,
207. See supra Part I (discussing views of civil recourse theorists Goldberg and
Zipursky).
208. See discussion supra Part I.
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all things considered. This situation reflects the problem of
protecting the victim's morally important interest in exerting
some control over the amends-making process. In particular,
the case of Carol and Will concerns primarily the victim's
morally important interest in controlling whether the
amends-making process takes place at all.
The case is also an example of bilateral struggle for
control over the amends-making process between injurer and
victim. Carol, in a sense, wrests Will's right to determine
whether or how the amends-making process takes place. But
usurpations of control can occur in multilateral situations
among the putative "victims" of wrongs. The threat in such
cases is not that the responsible party will set the terms of
engagement, thereby disregarding the victim's interests, but
rather that other self-proclaimed "victims" will behave in
ways that effectively undermine those interests.
To see how this can happen, consider a wrongdoing
affecting three people: Allison, Bob, and Carrie. Allison and
Bob are married. Allison discovers, however, that Bob is
having an affair. Allison is distraught. Carrie cannot stand
to see her friend Allison so upset, so she takes it upon herself
to confront Bob and demands that Bob pack up his belongings
and move out of Allison's house. Carrie-as Allison's friend-
is in a sense a foreseeable "victim" of Bob's infidelity since
she must suffer along with Allison and help her get through
this trying time. But there is a sense in which Bob can rightly
claim that this is none of Carrie's business, that she lacks
moral standing to confront him, and that she also lacks the
standing to make the demand that she is making. Bob did not
cheat on her, after all. The wrongdoing is primarily a matter
between Allison and Bob-not Carrie.
We may not sympathize with Bob's claims. But let us not
forget that Allison also has reason to be perturbed by Carrie's
conduct, no matter how well intentioned it was. By taking it
upon herself to demand that Bob move out, Carrie has
overstepped her bounds and usurped Allison's morally
important interests in controlling how the amends-making
process take place (if at all). By insisting that Bob move out,
Carrie has usurped Allison's judgment as to whether and how
the amends-making process plays out with Bob. What if
Allison wants to try to make the marriage work despite Bob's
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affair? Carrie has usurped, in effect, Allison's judgment on
the matter. Now suppose that Allison agrees with Carrie that
Bob should move out. Surely, Allison should be consulted on
how to execute Bob's moving out and the manner by which it
proceeds. So Carrie has interfered with not only Allison's
morally important interests in controlling whether the
amends-making process takes place; by demanding that Bob
move out, she has also encroached on her important interests
in controlling how this takes place, if at all.
Tort law slices through these Gordian knots. Consider
first the question of how to reinforce the victim's morally
important interests in control. Tort law protects these
interests by allocating to victims the right to file lawsuits
against wrongdoers. By allocating the right to demand
wrongdoers to make amends, victims are given control over
the initiation of the amends-making process, the timing of
that initiation (within defined limits), the claims asserted
against the wrongdoer, as well as defining the remedies
sought against the wrongdoer. To be sure, this control is far
from absolute; the remedies and claims brought in courts of
law are much more limited than those available in our moral
lives. Nor does tort law do anything to prevent the Carols of
the world from unilaterally trying to make amends
informally, against the wishes of the victim; the wrongdoers
have liberty interests in interacting with others that the law
may not wish to obstruct unnecessarily. But tort law does not
afford wrongdoers an avenue for coming forward to make
amends. Victims, not wrongdoers, have the primary power to
initiate-and hence control-the amends-making process in
tort law. Allocating the right to initiate litigation to victims
vindicates this interest in initiating the amends-making
process, as well as in controlling both how the amends-
making process takes place and the nature of the conciliatory
gesture demanded.
3. Epistemic Problems. Allocating the right to initiate
litigation to victims solves epistemic problems as well. These
problems are closely tied together with some of the problems
previously considered, but it is helpful to re-state them in
epistemic terms. Allocating the right to victims lets the
wrongdoer know, once victims come forward: (1) that there is
someone who feels very seriously wronged (one does not
initiate litigation, one hopes, without actual serious wrongs);
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(2) what the plaintiff wants; (3) how to make amends (the
amount demanded, or other remedies); and (4) that the
victim does want the injurer to make amends. This explains
why the duty to make amends is triggered upon demand
rather than at the moment of wrongdoing. The moral duty is
triggered upon the moment of wrongdoing, assuming the
victim wants amends to be made. But this feature of the
moral principle-the fact that the duty is contingent on what
the victim wants-is fraught with epistemic uncertainty.
Tort law reduces this uncertainty by stipulating that the
amends-making process does not commence until the victim
explicitly says so in the form of a demand. And the reason
why victims, rather than wrongdoers, are allocated the
responsibility to initiate amends-making processes is a moral
one: victims have morally important interests in controlling
aspects of the amends-making process, especially with
respect to whether there will be any such process at all. Tort
law eliminates a lot of the guesswork created by informal
amends-making procedures, as well as the moral principle of
making amends itself.
So much for the rough sketch of how making amends
relates to tort law. Tort law aims to mitigate the obstacles
facing the informal process of making amends and does so by
formalizing and standardizing the process in a way that
protects victims' morally important interests in controlling
aspects of that process.
Saying that tort law aims to mitigate obstacles, however,
does not mean it always succeeds. This is obvious. Making
available a formal mechanism for making amends may
induce victims to rush to the courthouse in an effort to extract
payments rather than exhaust their informal amends-
making options-options that may sometimes do a better job
satisfying everyone involved. 20 9 But, as we will see in Part VI,
the amends-making account still promises to make sense of
many of the institutional features of tort law that traditional
corrective justice accounts have difficulty explaining. And-
unlike Hershovitz's account-the amends-making account
takes as its touchstone principle an attractive principle of
209. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (describing informal and relatively low-cost norms of
dispute resolution among ranchers in California).
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making amends, one that remains attractive regardless of
whether we label it a theory of "corrective justice."
4. A Legal Principle of Making Amends. We have seen
some problems surrounding the moral process of making
amends, problems that we might usefully label the
circumstances of making amends.21 0 Tort law aims to
overcome these circumstances and facilitate those who want
to pursue claims through a formalized version of that process.
In light of these foregoing observations, we are in a position
to articulate a principle of making amends that resembles the
basic structure of tort law. Consider the following principle
of tort law:
Making Amends (Legal Version). Individuals who have
wronged others in ways recognized by law, or are otherwise
responsible for wrongs recognized by law that befall victims,
have a legal duty to perform a reasonable conciliatory gesture
as recognized by law to those victims, only when the victim
makes a legal demand of the wrongdoer (or responsible party)
to make amends.
The important part is the italicized addition "only" clause
at the end, which replaces the desire-based exception to the
general rule that wrongdoers have a moral duty to make
amends. The biggest difference between the moral version of
the principle and the legal version is that it specifies exactly
when the legal duty to make amends becomes operative: upon
demand by the victim.
210. Hershovitz mentions the "circumstances of corrective justice"-but we
mean different things. Hershovitz, Corrective Justice, supra note 9, at 117. He is
concerned, primarily, with the problem that corrective justice faces in all cases:
that a wrong cannot be undone. See id. We are concerned primarily, and instead,
with the many obstacles that often conspire to make it practically difficult for
parties to make amends with each other. Tort law aims, according to the making-
amends conception, to correct for these obstacles and smooth the path towards
making amends. For more on the origins and similar uses of this "circumstances
of' locution, see SHAPIRO, supra note 179, at 170, 420 n.11 (attributing the phrase
"circumstances of justice" to David Hume and John Rawls, and adopting his own
"circumstances of legality" that "obtain whenever a community has numerous and
serious moral problems whose solutions are complex, contentious, or arbitrary").
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V. OBJECTIONS, OLD AND NEW
Now that the broad outlines of the making-amends
approach are in place, let us consider how the approach help
answers the various objections already on the table. Then
we'll consider some new objections.
A. The Remedies Objection
The duty to make amends answers the remedies
objection. Rather than a duty of repair, there is a duty to
make amends. Notice that this is the feature of the principle
that allows us to respond to the remedies objection. As noted
in Part IV, the notion of making amends, like getting even, is
more open-ended than the notion of repair, which seems
distinctively interested in setting things back the way they
were before the injury occurred, or at least as close to that
position as practicably possible.2 1 1 Making amends does not
concern itself, primarily, with repairing losses. Making
amends is primarily about the person responsible for the
wrong making a reasonable and adequate conciliatory
gesture to victims. The way that this is accomplished is not
necessarily through offers to pay reparations-though in
many cases, this is the best way of expressing regret.
Sometimes an apology and an offer to pay for the neighbor's
damaged yard will be enough.2 12 As a result, and as we
observed in the prior subsection, the ways by which one can
211. To return to Tom and Jerry, when Tom negligently breaks Jerry's leg, it
makes sense to say that Tom should make amends to Jerry in consideration of
the loss. See Hershovitz, Corrective Justice, supra note 9, at 110-19. But it does
not make sense to say that a repayment of monetary debt owed between Tom and
Jerry involves a case of making amends. The existence of a debt does not involve
a wrong (unless the debt is overdue); but the negligently caused broken leg does
plausibly involve a wrongdoing. Hershovitz wanted to iron over the obvious
differences between Tom and Jerry in the debt case and in the broken leg case,
respectively; making amends highlights the differences. See id.
212. The neighbor may accept my apology, appreciate and acknowledge the
offer, yet decline it. Amends have been made. But on the Aristotelian account,
this is a failure of corrective justice because I have not repaired the damage done;
the neighbor has, at best, simply waived his right that I pay full reparations. This
does not change the fact, however, that Aristotelian corrective justice has not been
done on its own terms. See, e.g., Hershovitz, Corrective Justice, supra note 9, at
117 (discussing Aristotelian theory).
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make amends includes, but are not limited to reparations.
The fact that other forms of relief-like nominal, punitive,
and injunctive relief-are available in tort law should not be
surprising from the perspective of making amends.
B. The Substantive Standing Objection
Recall the substantive standing objection. 2 13 Goldberg
and Zipursky point out that causes of action arising in tort
all contain a substantive standing requirement that in effect
limits the class of plaintiffs to only those who can show that
they stand in a sufficiently close relationship to the
defendants' wrongdoing at issue.2 14 . They must show that
defendants accountable for that wrongdoing have wronged
them, not simply that they have suffered an injury as a result
of wrongful conduct. 2 15 The distinction is a subtle one that is
recognized in law but not easily captured in terms of
plausible moral principles. This creates a dilemma. If a
proposed principle of corrective justice contains a plausible
principle of moral responsibility, then the principle probably
fails to account for tort law's substantive standing
requirements. But if the principle can account for them, then
the principle probably does not count as a plausible notion of
responsibility and simply parrots the law's requirements
without providing independent explanatory power.2 16
The amends-making account helps to respond to this
objection. On the amends-making account, many of the
institutional features of torts can be thought of as solving
epistemic, practical, and moral problems that commonly
arise trying to make amends informally or as a result of
trying to enforce moral duties to make amends.2 1 7 In a
(cumbersome) slogan, the institution of tort law aims to
facilitate the amends-making process while protecting
morally important interests of the victim. But notice that
doing so will inevitably require having some way of
identifying a victim whose interests should be protected by
213. See supra Part I.B.
214. See supra Part I.B.
215. See supra Part I.B.
216. See supra Part I.B.
217. See supra Part IV.
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that institution. In light of this inevitability, so-called
"substantive standing" rules can be viewed as rules for
identifying genuine victims, with morally important
interests in initiating and controlling the amends-making
process, from those who have merely been collaterally injured
by the defendant's wrongdoing.
This maneuver echoes Hershovitz's to the extent that it
views substantive standing requirements as restrictions on
who may legitimately claim to have been wronged by the
defendant.2 18 But the present explanation goes further. Apart
from being more explicit about being an instrumentalist or
functionalist response, we now see precisely why the
response-if understood correctly-avoids the dilemma. We
should concede that moral liability for wrongs often does not
track legal liability for torts. That is, the response concedes
the point made by Goldberg and Zipursky: that tort law often
holds defendants legally liable even though they should not
be morally liable, and sometimes defendants should be held
morally liable even if they legally should not.2 19 And they are
also correct in explaining that this mismatch is very often
attributable to substantive standing requirements.2 20
But this concession is far from fatal. Goldberg and
Zipursky are mistaken to suggest that there is simply no
moral analogue to the substantive standing requirement.2 2'
Indeed, not only is there one (see examples infra Part V.D.3),
the amends-making account explains why the mismatch
between moral and legal liability nevertheless persists:
morally speaking, drawing a line between primary victims-
with morally important interests in controlling the amends-
making process-from those with much weaker claims, can
be quite difficult and fraught with disagreement and
controversy. Given this potential for disagreement, tort law
slices through the Gordian knot by introducing standards for
discerning genuine victims, in the form of substantive
standing requirements. There is still a mismatch, however,
given that law provides blunt instruments; the mismatch is
218. See supra Part III.B.
219. See supra Part I.B.
220. See supra Part I.B.
221. See supra Part I.B.
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predictable. But corrective justice still does justificatory work
indirectly: it explains why the institutional features of tort
law are what they are and tort law's mission statement, but
it does not explain tort law by providing a perfect normative
map by which we can navigate the main features of tort law.
Indeed, if we treat moral principles of corrective justice
as a map in this way, we wind up pretty disoriented. Civil
recourse theorists are right about this. But their dilemma, it
turns out, is a false one, because we can cite the practical
problems that arise in the context of applying moral
principles to explain the role of substantive standing
requirements, while explaining why moral and legal liability
will not be co-extensive: substantive standing requirements
are very, very blunt instruments used to separate genuine
victims of wrongdoing from those who have merely suffered
unwelcome fallout.2 22
C. The No-Legal-Duty Objection
So far we have seen that the making-amends account
provides the resources to respond to the remedies and
substantive standing objections. The third objection also
poses no difficulty. Indeed, the answer has already been
telegraphed. Recall Goldberg's statement of the objection,
which is basically that moral principles of corrective justice
fail to cut tort law at the joints:
Notice, however, that the conversion of the moral duty of repair into
a legal duty does not happen through the tort system unless and
until the victim decides to press a claim against the defendant. In
other words, if the defendant is going to be made to heed his duty
of repair, it will only be by virtue of the law's having empowered
the victim to demand of the defendant that he make amends for the
wrong done. . . . Corrective justice theory thus fails to capture
accurately the terms on which tort links a victim to a person who
has victimized her.223
We are now in a position to see what is correct about this
statement and what is not. To be sure, principles of corrective
justice that impose automatic duties of repair on wrongdoers
222. See supra Part IV.B.
223. Goldberg, Wrongs Without Recourse, supra note 6, at 13 (emphasis added).
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the moment they wrong others fail to cut tort law at the
joints. These duties, after all, are not sufficiently sensitive to
the victim's interests. But the Fourth Pass principle does not
impose this kind of duty.2 24 The principle instead specifies
that the victim must want the wrongdoer to make amends to
trigger the duty to do so. 225 But this means that the moral
duty, even if automatic, depends on the victim. Victims who
do not want wrongdoers to make amends deactivate
wrongdoers' duties to do so. The possibility that duties of
repair (or, on the amends-making view, duties to make
amends) pop in and out of existence mitigates the mismatch
between the law's structure and the structure of the relevant
moral principle. The moral duty to make amends, just like
the legal duty, is contingent on the victim in some way.
This does not mean, however, that the amends-making
conception is out of the woods yet. The moral duty to make
amends, after all, is contingent on a mental state of a victim-
i.e., victims must want wrongdoers to make amends to
activate that duty. What if the victim's desires change
minute to minute? Does that suggest that the wrongdoer's
duty flips on and off like a light switch? Seemingly so.
Meanwhile, the legal duty to make amends is triggered by
the plaintiffs conduct. What conduct suffices may vary by
jurisdiction.2 2 6 But this thought/conduct disparity between
the moral and legal principles prima facie shows that the no-
legal-duty objection still has some bite-at least on its face.
After all, the triggering conditions for those duties do not
perfectly align. If they did, then the legal duty to make
amends would be triggered the moment that the victim
224. See Part IV.A.3.
225. See Part IV.A.3.
226. Sometimes the filing of the lawsuit is required; other times, the victim need
only put the alleged wrongdoer on notice of the demand and when a precise
damages calculation can be made. Compare N.J. CT. C.P.R. 4:42-11(b) (starting
the clock for prejudgment interest in tort claims "from the date of the institution
of the action or from a date 6 months after the date the cause of action arises"),
with Levy-Zetner Co. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 142 Cal. Rptr. 1, 25 (Cal. Ct. App.
1977) (explaining that, for torts suits in California, "prejudgment interest runs
from the date when the damages are of a nature to be certain or capable of being
made certain by calculation and when the exact sum due to the plaintiff is made
known to the defendant").
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wanted the wrongdoer to make amends, and this is clearly
not how it works in tort law.
But once we understand the nature of the making-
amends explanation, the worry about mismatch goes away.
Recall that our understanding of tort law is a functionalist
one. Tort law aims to facilitate the amends-making process
by removing common obstacles to that process, as it occurs
informally. For this kind of explanation to succeed, alleged
mismatches between the moral and legal processes must be
plausibly explained by showing how those "mismatches" help
remove those obstacles. And this is exactly the kind of
explanation provided. Tort law allocates the right to initiate
litigation-the right to initiate the legal amends-making
process-to victims. And tort law does this to solve epistemic
problems (e.g., the victim's identity, the nature of the alleged
wrongdoing, and what amends they want made), and the
problem perhaps most overlooked: ensuring vindication of
the morally important interest that victims have in
controlling whether and how the amends-making process
takes place.
So tort law is explained in terms of corrective justice. The
explanation, however, is a functionalist one: that tort law
aims to facilitate the amends-making process involving a
certain class of serious wrongs.22 7 Mismatches between the
moral structure of making amends and the legal structure of
tort practice are not necessarily inadequacies of the
explanation or data points that the explanation failed to
capture. Rather, these mismatches must be explained in light
of the overall purpose of having an institution of tort law. The
point of the institution is to overcome many of the difficulties
arising from the informal, vague, and ambiguous moral
structure of the making amends principle and the process it
227. See, e.g., Gardner, What is Tort Law For?, supra note 204, at 19. Gardner
states:
A legal norm cannot play its partly constitutive role in relation to a moral
norm unless it also has some instrumental role to play in relation to the
same moral norm, unless conformity with the legal norm would help to
secure conformity with the moral norm of which the legal norm is
supposed to be partly constitutive.
Id.
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gives rise to. These mismatches, in many cases, can be
explained in terms trying to overcome these difficulties. 22 8 We
should not expect, therefore, that tort law perfectly align with
all the amorphous contours of the informal, moral process of
making amends. Indeed, if the morality of making amends
mapped so cleanly on to the law, we might wonder why we
even need the institution of law to get in the business of
making amends at all.229
D. Other Objections
The making-amends conception of corrective justice faces
challenging questions about its adequacy as an explanation
and justification for tort law, as well as about its status as a
genuine moral principle. These questions extend beyond the
challenges to corrective justice theory posed by Goldberg,2 3 0
228. The methodology presupposed here-that legal institutions arise to
address problems that cannot be solved by informal moral norms or customs-is
far from idiosyncratic. Perhaps the best known example of this methodology
comes to us from H.L.A. Hart's suggestion that law in general aims to overcome
the various inefficiencies and uncertainties that would be faced by a "pre-legal"
society governed exclusively by informal customs. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAw 91 (1961). This tradition is carried on today in, among other places, SHAPIRO,
supra note 179, at 170-71 (positing that legal institutions in general aim to correct
for deficiencies in nonlegal forms of social planning). John Gardner discusses a
similar methodological perspective in connection with tort law, specifically, en
route to defending instrumentalism in tort theory against non-instrumentalists
Jules Coleman and Ernest Weinrib. See Gardner, What is Tort Law For?, supra
note 204, at 19 ("[T]o fulfill its morally constitutive role, tort law's norm of
corrective justice must be evaluated as an instrument. It must be evaluated as an
instrument of improved conformity with the very moral norm [of corrective
justice] that it helps to constitute.") (first emphasis in original; second emphasis
added).
229. Here is another way to put the point. The explanation offered here does not
expect a one-to-one match between the basic structures. Indeed, the reason why
we even need something like the institution of tort law is because of the various
latent defects arising from reliance on first-order moral norms that are vague,
ambiguous, and in any event difficult to apply. Put differently, the reasons we
have tort law is to correct for epistemic, practical, and moral problems that arise
from the amends-making process. Tort law corrects for the defects of corrective
justice. So it would be surprising if there were a perfect match between the
normative structure of the moral norm and the legal one, given that the structure
of the moral norm is part of the problem.
230. See supra Part I.
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Hershovitz,2 3 1 and Zipursky.2 32 Although not every objection
can be considered, let us address some salient ones.
1. Can We Make Amends Through Tort Law? Here is one
objection: in an ideal case, a wrongdoer would come forward
and try to make amends to the victim for the wrongdoing and
would do so by offering a reasonable and adequate
conciliatory gesture, which the victim would accept. But
lawsuits seem far from the ideal. After all, there is a sense of
"conciliatory" behavior that may require the wrongdoer to
actually regret his wrongdoing, and which suggests that the
wrongdoer must personally acknowledge his conduct as
wrong. But if tort law aims to facilitate the amends-making
process, and if amends-making implies conciliatory gestures,
then tort law must be doing a horrible job since tort cases do
not police these subjective feelings of contrition. Nor do tort
suits require explicit acknowledgment of wrongdoing by the
defendant. In short, tort law does not look like it really is
geared towards making amends after all.
This objection rests on a misunderstanding. As explained
earlier, conciliatory gestures do not require the wrongdoer to
maintain any particular attitudes, even though ideally the
wrongdoer would regret wrongdoing.2 33 In the relevant sense,
we should understand conciliatory gestures as objectively
signaling regret and acknowledgement of wrongdoing. It is
perfectly possible within the framework outlined above that
someone can be found liable and forced to make a conciliatory
gesture to the victim, even though the wrongdoer does so
grudgingly. Recall Hatfield, who offers up, say, fresh produce
because he must, even though he does so grudgingly.2 3 4 Or
consider bickering siblings who are forced by their parents to
shake hands and hug to signify the end of the dispute, even
though neither sibling particularly wants to do so.
Conciliatory gestures needed to satisfy the duty to make
amends are objective, not subjective in nature.
If this analysis is correct, then the upshot for tort law is
clear: tort law can force parties to make amends by forcing
231. See Hershovitz, Corrective Justice, supra note 9, at 110-17.
232. See supra Part I.
233. See Part IV.A.2.
234. See Part IV.A.2.
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wrongdoers to offer up reasonable and adequate conciliatory
gestures to victims. The fact that the litigants may loathe
each other during and after the litigation and the fact that
the wrongdoer never feels regret, or even acknowledges
having done anything wrong, does not necessarily mean that
the wrongdoer has failed to satisfy his obligation to make
amends. And it should not be surprising that people can
satisfy their obligations without necessarily accepting the
legitimacy of those obligations, just as someone who rejects
the legitimacy of federal income taxes may wind up satisfying
his legitimate tax obligations by paying them.
2. The Distinctiveness Objection. Another challenge goes
as follows. In seeking to capture a broader array of remedies,
which the making-amends account surely does, the amends-
making conception arguably loses sight of what is (allegedly)
important and distinctive about tort law, which is its
apparent emphasis on repair.23 5 This duty gives guidance as
to the forms of redress appropriate and the amount of
compensation that is appropriate.2 3 6 But arguably the
making-amends conception fails to provide comparable
guidance.23 7 On the making-amends conception, the fact that
tort law awards compensatory damages as of right seems
contingent or accidental. To the contrary, a traditionalist
might insist, the fact that reparations are the default form of
redress reflects something normatively important that is far
from simply an accident of history. Only Aristotelian views
come close to explaining why reparations make any
normative sense.238
This objection has some bite. To some extent, the greater
indeterminacy in the making-amends conception with
respect to forms of redress is simply the theoretical cost of
being able to account for a greater variety of remedies. And
235. See Gardner, Torts and Other Wrongs, supra note 8, at 59; Stapleton, supra
note 178, at 1559-60; Part IV.A.2.
236. See Gardner, Torts and Other Wrongs, supra note 8, at 59.
237. Jules Coleman & Gabriel Mendlow, Theories of Tort Law, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edulentries/tort-theories/
(claiming that civil recourse theory gives "little guidance as to what sort of redress
is appropriate").
238. See supra Part I.C.
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this is a cost that the making-amends conception-along with
the getting-even conception-is willing to incur. To the
extent that the making-amends view feels pressured to
explain why the default rule of redress is the default rule of
compensation, the view seems destined to either go on
offense-like Hershovitz does, who claims that notion of
"repair" is itself misleading2 39-or emphasize that repair-
based explanations incur their own costs, such as the
difficulty in explaining the variety of remedies and damages
available beyond purely reparative ones. The whole exercise
feels like trying to put queen-sized sheets on a king-sized
mattress.
But perhaps the fact that courts award compensatory
relief by default does not, on reflection, represent any
particularly deep moral truth. As noted earlier, very few, if
any, gestures better signal regret than compensatory relief
designed to undo damage to the extent possible. 24 0 Again, if A
accidentally pushes B to the floor, then the most obvious way
to signal regret is by attempting to help B to his feet. So it is
no surprise that tort law's predominant method of redress
takes the form of undoing harms done via monetary or
injunctive relief. The mistake, however, is to see reparative
relief as the sine qua non of corrective justice.
We can scale up this point by imagining cultures where,
say, apologizing is a response morally on par with providing
adequate compensation.2 4 1 We must be careful not to mistake
the culture-independent, abstract moral principle of
corrective justice-which is fundamentally about making
amends-with particular entrenched forms by which we
make amends. Separating the two is not easy work; and, by
239. See supra Part III.A.
240. See supra Part IV.A.2 (explaining that conventional reparative relief might
be viewed as simply the best way to signal regret, objectively speaking).
241. We might not even have to imagine this society. See Jon 0. Haley,
Comment: The Implications of Apology, 20 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 499, 500-01 (1986)
(claiming that the refusal of one corporation to provide an apology to Japanese
defendants "held up a settlement for months"). For more on the role of apologies
and compensation in Japanese legal culture, see Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur
Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United
States, 20 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 461 (1986).
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explicating the concept of making amends, we risk
committing the same sin. But it is worth trying.
Here is another way to reconcile Aristotelian conceptions
of corrective justice with the idea of making amends.
Perhaps, after all is said and done, traditional corrective
justice theories have indeed articulated one genuine repair-
based principle of justice. Suppose further that they succeed
in showing that the core of tort law reflects this principle. It
still does not follow that the Aristotelian conception exhausts
the field of corrective justice, or that making amends has no
work left to do in illuminating private legal practices.
Aristotelians might simply be mistaking a particular species
with the broader genus. Corrective justice in this broader
sense of making amends might be the goal of private
litigation more generally. And if this is correct, then much of
the problem might be a problem of labeling-one that is not
particularly interesting. Making amends might be the
fundamental category pertaining to the problem of what
wrongdoers must do for their victims in the aftermath of their
wrongdoings, while corrective justice specifies the default
manner by which amends are made to victims. Let us not rule
out the possibility of reconciliation between Aristotelians and
those (like Hershovitz and the present author) seeking to
expand the scope of remedies with which Aristotelians are
preoccupied.
3. Does Making Amends Presuppose a Concept of Repair?
Another objection is that making amends simply presupposes
the concept of repair, since making amends typically suggests
trying to repair a frayed relationship.2 42 If So, this objection
would spell trouble because it (1) threatens to reintroduce the
problematic concept of repair; (2) shows that making amends
itself presupposes some version of the Aristotelian, repair-
based view of corrective justice; and (3) shows that making
amends might not be so well suited to illuminate tort practice
after all, since tort suits are frequently populated by
strangers who had no prior relationship before the suit. So if
there is no prior relationship, what is there to "mend"?
The short answer to this is that the amends-making
account of making amends presupposes neither a pre-
242. See Radzik, supra note 188, at 146-47.
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existing relationship (prior to the wrong that unites the
victim and wrongdoer) nor any robust concept of repair. On
the amends-making account, making amends does not
presuppose that a pre-existing relationship exists between
wrongdoer and victim. To be sure, there is a sense in which
we all bear a moral relationship with respect to one another,
a relationship that we do not hold toward, say, crab grass.
But if this abstract, moral sense of "relationship" is the
relevant one, then we should be skeptical that this is the kind
of relationship that ever needs repair. It is an unbreakable
relationship between persons that makes us accountable to
one another invariably. On the other hand, if a weaker sense
of "relationship" is in play-such as the relationship between
lovers that can be broken-then we should resist the claim
that making amends necessarily is in the business of
repairing these more fragile relationships. It is too easy to
think of cases in which the victim, although wanting and
demanding amends, wants nothing further to do with the
wrongdoer besides those amends-and can hold this attitude
without denying that the moral relationship that holds
between persons can ever be frayed.24 3
4. The Arbitration Objection. The Arbitration Objection
begins by observing that alternative dispute resolution
(ADR), such as arbitration or mediation, might do a better job
at getting parties to make amends than tort law.2 44 Three
considerations might bolster this view: (1) making amends
and ADR both allow for a broader range of remedies than tort
law;2 45 (2) ADR is (arguably) more likely to result in a
reasonable and conciliatory gesture than tort law; and (3) the
substantive rules that govern ADR and the process of making
amends are far more flexible than those found in substantive
243. There is clearly more to this objection-as well as more to say in response.
Much of Linda Radzik's recent book is devoted to defending a conception of
making amends that sees the goal of the process as repairing relationships. See
generally RADZIK, supra note 184.
244. See, e.g., Thomas 0. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 329,
362 (2005).
245. See, e.g., id. (noting that remedies available in alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) include not only "monetary and injunctive remedies" but can
also "promote certain behavior, restructure relationships, and impose outcomes
beyond the legal and practical reach of courts").
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tort law and civil procedure.2 4 6 Given these observations, a
natural thought is that the amends-making conception of
corrective justice helps make sense of ADR, but not tort law.
None of these observations is worrisome. Recall that the
making-amends approach seeks to explain tort law, but it
does not seek to explain it by showing how the normative
structure of corrective justice maps cleanly onto the
normative structure of tort law. The explanation is
functionalist in a way that explains why there will be some
structural mismatches between the two normative domains.
The approach predicts that legal norms aim to correct for
certain shortcomings in the ordinary moral process of making
amends. But to the extent that the ordinary moral process
works for people or some other more formal process of private
arbitration provides an adequate substitute, so much the
better: tort law need not get involved.
We can see how this observation helps answer the
objection. Tort law does not aspire to be the only formal
mechanism that facilitates the amends-making process; it is
the formal mechanism of last resort. To the extent that
individuals can make amends without arbitrators or
mediators, they might avail themselves of a much broader
range of potential remedies, as well as address a much wider
range of wrongs. To the extent individuals cannot make
amends on their own, other, formal and private grievance
procedures might be available. The range of remediable
wrongs and remedies narrows, however, once these
individuals try to take their grievances to private arbitrators.
And by the time the victim and wrongdoer reach the court
246. See id. at 366. Main notes the "substantive flexibility" of certain forms of
ADR:
In the more voluntary and less structured forms of ADR, such as
mediation, where the ultimate authority belongs to the participants
themselves, the parties (perhaps with the benefit of a third party
facilitator) can fashion a unique solution that will work for them without
being strictly governed by precedent. Thus, "mediators do not 'judge';
they aid the parties in ending a dispute." ADR is attractive to some, then,
because of the system's promise of "better" results that serve "the real
needs of the participants or society." These results may or may not
"follow the law," and it arguably does not matter because of the parties'
voluntary acquiescence to the resolution.
Id.
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system, the range narrows even further. So the objection is
in a sense correct: ADR does prima facie promise to achieve
corrective justice-and maybe even better than tort law-
given the broader range of remediable wrongs and remedies
potentially available. But that does not mean that the
making-amends view fails to explain tort law. It just shows
that the nature of the explanation is an instrumentalist one.
Tort law steps in as the institution of corrective justice of last
resort, to correct for failures of the informal process of
making amends, as well as formal (but nonlegal) institutions
like private arbitration or mediation.
Looking at tort law this way, moreover, has a
considerable benefit in squaring corrective justice with
another commonly observed fact about civil litigation: most
cases settle, and moreover, public courts actively encourage
settlement by litigants.2 47 This feature of tort litigation might
be viewed as worrisome from the perspective of traditional
conceptions of corrective justice, which hold that corrective
justice is accomplished only upon awarding full reparative
compensation by the wrongdoer to the victim. 2 48 After all,
widespread settlement raises the possibility that, at nearly
any stage of litigation, a plaintiff may agree with a
defendant's offer to settle at values well below what they
might be entitled to as a matter of compensatory relief. From
the perspective of repair-based accounts of corrective justice,
any time a plaintiff entitled to compensatory damages settles
for something below full compensatory relief; this is a prima
facie injustice. Settlement, in these circumstances, fails to
achieve corrective justice of the Aristotelian variety.
247. It is widely acknowledged that most lawsuits in the United States settle,
and that the legal system contains various mechanisms that serve to encourage
settlement rather than public adjudication. For a thorough but critical review of
these facts about U.S. legal practice, see Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases
Settle" Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339
(1994).
248. JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAw 203 (1988) [hereinafter
COLEMAN, MARKETS] ("If justice requires giving each party his or her due ... his
or her desert, then settlements almost never satisfy this principle of justice. One
concern, then, is the extent to which parties can legitimately or justifiably
negotiate around the requirements of justice, and the extent to which legal
institutions that encourage their doing so . . . are desirable and defensible.").
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True, encouraging settlement might be explained on
grounds of efficiency and cost. Courts are costly institutions
with heavy caseloads. So it makes sense that they concern
themselves with live disputes only.24 9 Surely, however, if tort
law embodies the principle of corrective justice and seeks to
ensure that corrective justice is done, why should courts
encourage settlement, even in cases where they think
plaintiffs might be entitled to full compensation?2 5 0 Why then
do judges regularly approve of settlements that fall well
lower than compensatory relief, even in cases where the
defendants appear to have tortiously injured the plaintiffs?2 5 '
And why do courts lack the authority to more regularly
revisit settlements that are inadequate? The law seems to
discourage revisiting settlements and binding arbitration,
even in cases in which it is fairly clear that the results of
those processes fall short of full compensation. 25 2
None of these mysteries is difficult to explain, however,
on accounts of corrective justice that do not regard full
compensatory relief as the sine qua non of corrective justice.
The default rule in some jurisdictions is that courts simply
do not get involved in settlements. 25 3 True, they sometimes
police the outer boundaries of decency in approving these
settlements, and hence are at least nominally required to
249. See, e.g., People v. Lybarger, 700 P.2d 910, 915 (Colo. 1985) ("Courts exist
for the purpose of deciding live disputes involving 'flesh-and-blood' legal problems
with 'data relevant and adequate to an informed judgment."') (quoting New York
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
250. See COLEMAN, MARKETS, supra note 248, at 203.
251. Id. at 204-05.
252. On arbitration, see, e.g., Duferco Int'l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness
Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 388 (2d Cir. 2003) ("It is well established that courts
must grant an arbitration panel's decision great deference."). The circumstances
under which federal courts are permitted to revisit arbitration decisions are
severely limited by statute. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp.,
548 F.3d 85, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1
et seq. (2006)).
253. See, e.g., Estate of Sa'adoon v. Prince, 660 F. Supp. 2d 723, 724-25 (E.D.
Va. 2009) ("Federal courts are not vested with a general power to review and
approve settlements of suits between private parties. . . . It is fair to say, then,
that federal courts as a general matter do not review and approve settlements of
lawsuits between private parties."). But see id. at 725 (listing exceptions).
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determine whether they are reasonable. 25 4 But they police to
ensure reasonableness-not necessarily to ensure that
plaintiffs who might prevail receive full compensatory
relief.255 The making amends account explains why:
corrective justice requires a reasonable and adequate
conciliatory gesture to the victim-and victims are typically
in the best position to determine what gesture counts as
reasonable and adequate.
CONCLUSION
Corrective justice theorists seek to explain tort law's key
concepts in terms of principles of corrective justice, which are
typically understood to incorporate duties of repair. But
these accounts face seemingly powerful criticisms from civil
recourse theorists, who point out important features of tort
law's normative structure that corrective justice theory has
difficulty explaining. They propose rejecting corrective
justice theory. Scott Hershovitz responds by arguing that,
rather than abandoning corrective justice as an explanation
of tort law, we should alter our understanding of corrective
justice itself.
This paper continues the dialectic. We saw how
Hershovitz's understanding of corrective justice incompletely
responds to these criticisms and threatens to distort rather
than illuminate tort law. And we have tried to provide a new
account of corrective justice both plausible in its own right
254. A federal judge in the Southern District of New York, made headlines when
he declined to approve a settlement between the Securities and Exchange
Commission and Citigroup Global Markets. See Edward Wyatt, Judge Rejects an
S.E.C. Deal with Citigroup, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2011, at Al. This grabbed
attention in part because courts rarely disapprove of settlements involving the
agency. The court found that the proposed settlement, according to which
Citigroup admitted no wrongdoing, was "neither fair, nor reasonable, nor
adequate, nor in the public interest." SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., 827 F. Supp.
2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The case is on appeal. See SEC v. Citigroup Global
Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2012).
255. See, e.g., Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, 679 F.2d 1350, 1353,
1355 (11th Cir. 1982) (explaining that, even in the context of claims pursued
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which requires federal courts to
closely scrutinize settlements between employees and employers, the overarching
goal of these judicial evaluations is to ensure that they represent "a fair and
reasonable resulution [sic] of a bona fide dispute over FLSA provisions").
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and able to rebut the objections against traditional, repair-
based conceptions. In reorienting our understanding of
corrective justice, we relied on some of Hershovitz's insights.
He is correct, for example, to recognize that responding to one
of the objections-the "remedies" objection-requires
describing the core duty of corrective justice in more general
terms. Out went the duty of repair, and in came the more
fundamental, and more abstract, duty to make amends. The
other objections attacked the ability of corrective justice to
explain the basic normative structure of tort law, by focusing
on so-called "substantive standing" requirements and the
fact that no duty of redress arises at the moment a tort
occurs. Because these objections are structural in nature,
they require a structural response. To that end, we
conjectured that the goal of tort law is to facilitate the
amends-making process in a way that protects the morally
important interests of victims to control how that process
proceeds, if at all. This instrumentalist approach to tort
theory helped to explain the structural mismatch.
We also examined the issue of victim control, which has
been almost entirely overlooked in the literature on
corrective justice. But it should not be. Considering victims'
interests in control helps to provide a more nuanced
understanding of corrective justice, as well as a largely
untapped explanatory resource wholly consistent with
corrective justice. It allows us to explain, for example, why
victims are allocated rights of action in tort, as opposed to
imposing affirmative legal obligations on wrongdoers to come
forward in the aftermath of their wrongdoings: allocating
that obligation on wrongdoers would overlook the moral
importance of affording the right of victims to simply forego
amends. And imposing obligations on wrongdoers threatens
to divest victims of the important interest they have in
initiating the amends-making process, including having the
first crack and making and shaping their allegations.
But there has been a tacit concession to Goldberg and
Zipursky throughout this paper that I have tried to make
explicit. They argue that corrective justice theories do not
always cut tort law at the joints. The amends-making account
does not either. But the account does explain why this should
not be worrisome. This is because, in saying that tort law
aims to facilitate the informal amends-making process by
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correcting for certain problems inherent in that process, one
need not be committed to claiming that the normative
structure of tort law and corrective justice map onto each
other perfectly and in every respect. Indeed, because law is a
blunt and formal instrument that tries to make the rights
and responsibilities of parties more explicit than they would
otherwise be in the subtle and informal world of morality, we
should expect there to be an imperfect mapping from one
domain to the other. The making-amends account gives us
some way to predict where the mismatch will happen
legitimately.
This article remains a sketch. Making good on the
promises of the making-amends conception of corrective
justice and tort law will require further work. One issue that
needs to be addressed is to see whether the making-amends
conception is compatible with strict liability doctrines. This
is an important area of tort law that has notoriously posed
difficulties for corrective justice theories. Another important
project is to show how, if at all, this very abstract theory has
normative bite. Does it leave tort law just as it is or does it
help us resolve some enduring controversies about tort law?
Does the making-amends conception favor some default rules
over others? There is also work to be done in fleshing out a
conception of responsibility that best coheres with the
making-amends conception.
In any event, we should share Scott Hershovitz's
optimism that tort theorists and theorists of private law more
generally will benefit from expanding our understanding of
corrective justice. Doing so will not only help illuminate tort
law, but will also help us to reconcile corrective justice and
civil recourse theory. They are natural complements, not
competitors.25 6 But this is also a project for another occasion.
256. Others seek a similar reconciliation. See, e.g., Arthur Ripstein, Civil
Recourse and Separation of Wrongs and Remedies, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 163, 198-
203 (2011).
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